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 ABSTRACT 
 
AIM OF INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION: DETERRENCE AND 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT  
Çil, Deniz  
M.A., Department of International Relations  
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Yüksel İnan 
 
June 2010 
 
 
 International community while establishing international mechanisms to 
prosecute and punish perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity and the 
crime of genocide assumed that international prosecution would have a deterrent 
effect on potential perpetrators. Thus, this thesis aims to analyze the extent of 
contribution by international justice mechanisms to the prevention of grave human 
rights violations in an ongoing conflict. In other words, this thesis tries to figure out 
whether the predetermined purpose of deterring future crimes is realized or not by 
international criminal courts. After examining the scope of international criminal 
justice system and deterrence theory in criminology literature, a discussion on the 
applicability of deterrence theory to the international context is provided. The main 
argument of this thesis is that if an international criminal court gets actively involved 
in a conflict, it would have deterrent effect on potential perpetrators. In order to test 
this hypothesis a case study on the conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo and the 
involvement of International Criminal Court is conducted. 
 
Keywords: International Criminal Court, International Humanitarian Law, 
International Criminal Law, Criminology, Deterrence Theory, Armed Conflict, 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
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 ÖZET 
 
ULUSLARARASI KOVUŞTURMANIN AMACI: CAYDIRICILIK VE 
ULUSLARARASI CEZA MAHKEMESİ 
Çil, Deniz 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Yüksel İnan 
 
Haziran 2010 
 
 Uluslararası toplum savaş suçları, insanlığa karşı işlenen suçlar ve soykırım 
suçu faillerini kovuşturmak ve cezalandırmak için uluslararası mekanizmalar 
kurduğu sırada, uluslararası kovuşturmanın muhtemel failler üzerinde de caydırıcı bir 
etkisi olacağını öngörmüştü. Bu nedenle, bu tez uluslararsı adli mekanizmalarin 
devam etmekte olan çatışmalardaki insan hakları ihallerini önlemekteki katkısını 
incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bir başka deyişle, bu tez önceden belirlenmiş 
caydırıcılık amacının uluslararası ceza mahkemelerince gerçekleştirilip 
gerçekleştirilmediği ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadır. Uluslararası ceza sisteminin 
kapsamını ve kriminoloji literatüründeki caydırıcılık teorisini incelendikten sonra, 
caydırıcılık teorisinin uluslararası bağlamda uygulanabilirliği üzerine bir tartışma 
sunulmaktadır. Bu tezdeki ana argüman eğer bir uluslararası ceza mahkemesi bir 
çatışmaya aktif olarak müdahale ederse, muhtemel failler üzerinde caydırıcı bir 
etkisinin olacağı yönündedir. Bu hipotezi test etmek için Uluslararası Ceza 
Mahkemesi’nin Demokratik Kongo Cumhuriyeti’ndeki çatışmaya müdahelesi 
incelenmektedir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası Ceza Mahkemesi, Uluslararası İnsancıl Hukuk, 
Uluslararası Ceza Hukuku, Kriminoloji, Caydırıcılık Teorisi, Silahlı Çatışma, 
Demokratik Kongo Cumhuriyeti 
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CHAPTER I
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The history of international prosecutions of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity goes back to the end of the Second World War with the establishment of 
ad hoc international military tribunals (IMT) in Nuremberg and Tokyo to try German 
and Japanese war criminals of the Second World War. Especially the atrocities 
committed by the Nazi Germany in the European front of the war and the discovery 
of the detention camps established for Jewish citizens of Germany, which brought 
the genocide of Jewish people into light, triggered massive reactions in the 
international community. “Never again” was the motto of world politicians at those 
times. IMTs at Nuremberg and Tokyo were unprecedented in the sense that it was the 
first time that war criminals were being tried and punished by an international 
authority. This also underlined the understanding in the world community that war 
time atrocities and humanitarian law violations are topics of concern to the humanity. 
Prior to World War II, war criminals were to be tried and punished by either military 
or civil national courts. These had not attracted that much public attention because of 
the insignificant numbers and locality of prosecutions. 
  
Right after the Second World War, there were also efforts initiated by the 
United Nations (UN) to establish an international criminal court, which proved 
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 fruitless in the wake of political confrontation in the United Nations Security Council 
due to the Cold War. Therefore, approximately 50 years passed without any real 
incentive to establish an international court to prosecute international crimes, namely 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in particular. However, the end of 
the Cold War as well as the need to address the atrocities in the Former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda paved the way of creating international criminal justice mechanisms. 
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) could also be considered as unprecedented 
since they are different from IMTs of the Second World War. These were completely 
civil institutions involved in armed conflicts, which were not international. 
Especially in the case of ICTY, the Tribunal was established while the conflict was 
still going on in the territory of Former Yugoslavia with the assumption that 
prosecution of perpetrators would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of 
peace while ensuring that international humanitarian law violations were halted and 
redressed. 
 
In addition to the establishment of ICTY and ICTR, hybrid courts such as the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Ad hoc Human Rights Court for East Timor and 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia or Iraqi Special Tribunal are the 
recent examples of the developments in the execution of international humanitarian 
law. The proliferation in the numbers of international judicial bodies proves that the 
idea of individual accountability for grave human rights and humanitarian law 
violations has evolved potently in the international politics. Besides the issue of 
accountability, international criminal courts are currently considered in the peace 
making and peace building strategies for conflict torn societies. The logic behind the 
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 establishment of these international criminal courts is that an international judicial 
body, even in a case of ineffectiveness or reluctance of domestic criminal courts of 
the countries concerned, would act as a deterrent for future crimes. The references to 
the deterrence argument could easily be observed in the documents that establish 
those courts especially the ones that were to be involved in an ongoing conflict. 
  
Most recently and explicitly, in the preamble of Rome Statute of International 
Criminal Court, it is stated that the creation of an International Criminal Court would 
contribute to the termination of culture of impunity for the grave violations of human 
rights and to the prevention of such violations in the future. Some international 
lawyers and scholars also supported the deterrence argument in international criminal 
justice system and argued that the more perpetrators are prosecuted, the more they 
would establish precedents for others who would be deterred of committing such 
crimes because of the risk of prosecutions and trials by the international community. 
Moreover, the proponents of this idea suggest that since all the crimes punishable by 
international criminal justice system require planning and organization to some 
extent either committed by governments or by militias, prosecutions and trials would 
increase the risks and change the calculations of individuals before committing those 
crimes. Therefore, the prosecution of especially high profile perpetrators such as 
leaders, heads of states and commanders who bear the greatest responsibility of 
planning and commanding would set up a general deterrent effect. 
  
The view of prevention of international crimes through the deterring impact 
of international criminal justice is widely supported among policy makers, 
international law scholars and human rights activists. Moreover, the report of the 
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 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, entitled “the 
Responsibility to Protect”, states that legal measures could also be employed as a 
mean of direct prevention efforts and argues that the establishment of international 
criminal courts would lead the potential perpetrators of crimes against humanity, war 
crimes etc. to concentrate on the risks of international prosecutions (ICISS, 2001: 
24). Nevertheless, there is limited work on the real impact of the international 
criminal tribunals on an ongoing conflict. Most literature on international and 
humanitarian law focuses on issues such as the legal basis of jurisdiction, the 
definition of crimes, or the applicability of international humanitarian and criminal 
law rules to certain cases. On the other hand, the literature on civil conflict mainly 
focuses on the interventions in the form of military interventions, economic 
assistance, and peace operations. Nevertheless it does not pay sufficient attention to 
the involvement of international criminal justice mechanisms and their effect on the 
course of the conflict. In that sense, this research intends to make a contribution first 
to the international law literature by focusing on the impact of the practices of 
international criminal courts on an ongoing conflict instead of discussing 
jurisdictional and definitional matters, and secondly to the literature on civil conflict 
by examining involvement of justice mechanisms. Therefore, this research tries to 
answer the question of “how do the activities of international criminal justice 
mechanism contribute the prevention of grave human rights violations in an ongoing 
conflict?” In addition, the activities of international criminal tribunals in the scope of 
this research are categorized under two headings, passive involvement and active 
involvement. The former is defined by the referral of a case to the tribunal and 
opening of investigations by the Office of Prosecutor. Regarding the latter, for an 
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 international criminal court to be considered as actively involved in a conflict there is 
also a need to secure the custody of indictees and commence trails. Bearing in mind 
the two types of involvement, the main methodology of this research in examining 
the impact of international criminal tribunals on conflicts is a single case study with a 
comparison of the passive involvement of ICC in DRC between 2004 and 2006 and 
the active involvement 2006 onwards. Although probably it is not the best way to 
make generalizations, a single case study seems to be the most suitable one when the 
scope of this research and available data are considered. 
 
Since deterring future crimes and ending atrocities as well as the culture of 
impunity are predetermined aims in establishing international criminal courts, this 
research intends to examine whether international criminal justice mechanisms will 
contribute to the prevention of atrocities through deterring violations of humanitarian 
law in ongoing conflict situations. Therefore, the second chapter of this thesis aims to 
scrutinize the extent of the international criminal justice system, its evolution and 
enforcement with references to the sources of international humanitarian law and 
examples of national and international enforcement mechanisms as well as the aims 
of prosecutions. The Chapter 3 examines deterrence theory in criminology literature 
for domestic criminal systems since the deterrence argument in international criminal 
justice system is incorporated from the criminology literature. Therefore, the third 
chapter, while explaining the classical deterrence theory and its assumptions also 
focuses on the recent deterrence theories as well as the studies that test the validity of 
deterrence theory. The fourth chapter provides a merger of the two former chapters 
on international criminal justice and theory of deterrence and discusses the 
applicability of deterrence theory to the international context. This chapter also 
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 presents divergent views on the applicability of deterrence theory to the international 
criminal justice system as well as the main assumptions in this research. The fifth 
chapter analyzes the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where 
currently the International Criminal Court (ICC) is involved with an aim to reveal the 
impact of the ICC’s activities in the conflict in this country. This analysis also 
includes a brief history of the conflict. Finally, the last chapter presents the 
concluding remarks of the research.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
 
 
The current chapter will provide a detailed analysis of the international 
criminal justice system. The aim of this analysis is to examine the scope, evolution 
and the enforcement of the international criminal justice system which is essential to 
scrutinize before any attempt to study the impact of the system through enforcement 
mechanisms in ongoing conflict situations. 
  
International criminal justice system refers to the norms and rules of the 
international humanitarian law, human rights law and to the mechanisms that are 
empowered to execute these norms and rules. However, the substantive element of 
law in international criminal justice system mainly stems from the international 
humanitarian law in which international crimes are mostly determined. “International 
Humanitarian Law is […] concerned with international crimes and includes genocide 
and crimes against humanity, whether committed in times of war or in times of peace 
[and] also concerned with the trial and the punishment of those who have committed 
such crimes” (Goldstone and Smith, 2009: 10). The crime of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes have been defined and codified by the international 
humanitarian law norms through several conventions and international agreements as 
well as by the statutes of international tribunals, and interpreted by the judgments of 
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 those tribunals. Before proceeding with the criminal aspect of the system, the 
following section will try to analyze the substantive part of the international 
humanitarian law and its place in the laws of armed conflict and in international law 
in general. 
 
 
2.1. Laws of Armed Conflict and International Humanitarian Law 
 
The international humanitarian law is a branch of the laws of armed conflict 
which is concerned with the protection of the victims of armed conflicts who are not 
active in conflict due to injury, sickness, capture or who are civilians (McCoubrey, 
1990: 1). The laws of armed conflict are an important part of public international law 
(Pictet, 1988: xix) and go back to the history of war aimed to maintain the control, 
disciple and efficiency of military forces and to limit the impact of violence and 
destruction1 (Bouchet-Saulnier, 2007: 212). Although sometimes international 
humanitarian law and laws of armed conflict are utilized interchangeably by many 
scholars, there is a widely acknowledged categorization of laws of armed conflict 
which divide the body of the rules governing armed conflict as jus ad bellum and jus 
in bello.  
 
Jus ad bellum is the term used for the body of rules that sets limits to the use 
of armed forces as a means of conduct in international relations (McCoubrey and 
White, 1992: 1). This category deals with the use of force as a state practice, which is 
8 
                                                            
1 The laws of war were existent even in the era of knights as chivalric codes. Examples can be given 
from Thirty Years’ War and the Articles of War issued by Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus in 1621 
or from 19th century’s Lieber Code released on 24 April 1893 by Abraham Lincoln which is officially 
known as “the Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field”. It is 
further possible to trace the humanitarian concerns in military doctrines far back to 500-200 BC, for 
example the Art of War, Chinese Classic on military strategy written in 500 BC by Sun Tzu and the 
Indian Code of Manu developed between 200 BC and 200 AD (See, Goldstone and Smith, 2009: 15 – 
17; Beigbeder, 1999: 4-6). 
 
 prohibited by the Charter of the United Nations Article 2 paragraph 4.2 The only 
exception to use force in the UN Charter is “self-defence” that should be in 
accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, which states that: 
 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council 
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right 
of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security 
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to 
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.  
 
 
Therefore, jus ad bellum is applicable before an armed conflict is initiated and 
concerned with the legality of use of force which is beyond the scope of this 
research.  
 
Jus in bello, on the other hand, refers to the rules and norms applicable during 
an armed conflict and is not concerned with the nature or legality of war, rather aims 
to protect the victims of war (McCoubrey, 1990: 5). Jus in bello has also two sub-
divisions which are generally known as the Hague Conventions of 1907 and the 
Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949. The appellation of the sub-divisions comes 
from the places that the international conventions were signed. Hague Conventions 
of 1907 govern and limit the means and methods of warfare, which include weapon 
types and usage, tactics and general operational conduct (McCoubrey and White, 
1992: 189). Whereas, Geneva Conventions of 1949 have the purpose of protecting 
the victims of armed conflict or at least ameliorating their conditions (McCoubrey 
9 
                                                            
2 Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, art.2 para.4, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml [hereinafter the U.N. Charter].  
 
 and White, 1992: 189). Initially, the term international humanitarian law used to refer 
the Geneva Conventions because of the humanitarian concerns of the provisions; 
however, it should be noted that the Hague Conventions have also humanitarian 
concerns. Likewise the Geneva Conventions have also provisions regarding the 
means and methods of warfare. Therefore, the distinction is not a straight one and the 
humanitarian law should include both (McCoubrey, 1990: 2). Especially after the 
adoption of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, (Protocol 
I), which have provisions on the methods and means of warfare under Part III, the 
distinction between Geneva Conventions and Hague Conventions has blurred to a 
greater extent (Pictet, 1988: xx). Therefore, it is possible to argue that the current 
usage of international humanitarian law as a concept refers to the entire body of laws 
of armed conflict that become operational during the conflict (Meron, 2006: 1). 
While trying to define the international humanitarian law and its place in laws of 
armed conflict and international law in general, it would be better to make a 
reference to the body of international human rights law and its distinction from the 
humanitarian law to provide a more lucid understanding of the scope of international 
humanitarian law.  
 
 
2.2. International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law 
 
Unlike human rights law, international humanitarian law does not establish 
universal rights applicable to all people in all times of either peace or war (Bouchet-
Saulnier, 2007: 214). The Geneva Conventions, as the official names of the 
conventions also suggest, are protecting certain categories of people. There are 4 
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 categories of people, which are wounded, sick, prisoners of war or civilians. On the 
other hand, human rights law aims to guarantee that all individuals benefit from basic 
rights and freedoms and deals with the relationship between the state and its own 
subjects as opposed to the humanitarian law which is regulating the relation between 
the state and enemy subjects (Pictet, 1988: xxi). Moreover, international 
humanitarian law tolerates the killing and wounding of innocents such as civilian 
victims of the lawful collateral damage, or permits certain deprivations of freedom 
without any judicial processes as in the case of prisoners of war, or allows limitations 
on appeal rights of detained persons which are, on the contrary, regarded as 
fundamental rights of people that should be protected under the human rights law 
(Meron, 2006: 8). Therefore, international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law are two distinct systems in regard to their applicability and 
fundamental principles but have interactions with each other. 
 
 
2.3. Sources of International Humanitarian Law 
 
The sources of international humanitarian law are several international 
conventions and the statutes of courts, tribunals, and special chambers etc. that have 
jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against peace, crimes against humanity and 
genocide. However, the customary international law, general principles of law and 
judicial decisions that interpret and clarify the terms and scope of international 
humanitarian law should also be considered as legitimate sources, since the Statute of 
International Court of Justice lists all of them as the sources that shall be applied by 
the Court in an hierarchical manner while giving its decision. Therefore, I will try to 
11 
 
 examine the sources of international humanitarian law abiding by the ordering of the 
International Court of Justice, which is: 
 
1) International conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules recognized by […] states; 
2) International custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law; 
3) The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
4) […] judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for 
determination of rules of law.3 
 
 
2.3.1. International Conventions Establishing Rules Recognized by States  
 
Besides the efforts to codify laws of armed conflict by individual states, the 
first international convention is the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded in Armies in the Field signed on 22 August 1864 which is also 
widely known as Geneva Convention of 1864.4 This convention was based on the 
observations of Henry Dunant from the Battle of Solferino (Goldstone and Smith, 
2008: 17). By accidentally arriving at the battlefield in the village of Solferino where 
forces of Napoleon III and Austria were confronting (Destexhe, 1996: 50), Henry 
Dunant witnessed the conditions of the wounded and wrote his memoires, which led 
to the adoption of the Geneva Convention of 1864 and the creation of today’s 
International Committee of Red Cross (Goldstone and Smith, 2008: 17). The 
Convention was predictably limited in scope when compared to its successors since 
it was dealing with the immediate issues arising from the Battle of Solferino 
however, it established the fundamental principles of neutrality of humanitarian aid 
12 
                                                            
3Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, ICJ Basic Documents, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0   
4Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Fields, August 
22, 1864, International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) Treaty Database, 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/TOPICS?OpenView [Hereinafter Geneva Convention of 1864].  
 
 (McCoubrey, 1990: 11-12). Geneva Convention of 1864, which can be argued as the 
first example of jus in bello regulating the conditions of victims of war, was followed 
by an international conference which produced the Declaration Renouncing the Use, 
in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grams Weight on 11 December 
1868.5 Commonly referred as St. Petersburg Declaration, this declaration is 
considered to be the first modern international humanitarian law since it aimed to 
prohibit certain means and methods of warfare with a purpose of limiting 
unnecessary suffering (Goldstone and Smith, 2008: 18). Although the declaration 
was concerned with a very specific context of arms limitation, the doctrine of 
“unnecessary suffering” has become a significant principle in the modern jus in bello 
(McCoubrey and White, 1992: 225). These two conventions were succeeded by 
several conventions on the issues of means and methods of warfare, naval and 
airfare, cultural property and victims of warfare. Some of them were adopted for 
limited purposes such as the ones germane to asphyxiating gases6 or expanding 
bullets,7 or such as the ones relative to the laying of automatic submarine contact 
mine,8 whereas some others established more comprehensive rules of armed conflict. 
There are over a hundred of international conventions forming the regime of the laws 
of armed conflict. However, the most important ones that are cited also in the statutes 
of the international tribunals are the Hague Conventions of 1907, particularly the 
Forth Hague Convention of 1907 regulating laws and customs of war on land and the 
13 
                                                            
5Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grams Weight, 
December 11, 1868, ICRC Treaty Database, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/TOPICS?OpenView 
[Hereinafter St.Petersburg Declaration].   
6Declaration concerning the Asphyxiating Gases, July 29, 1899, ICRC Treaty Database, 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/165?OpenDocument  
7Declaration concerning Expanding Bullets, July 29, 1899, ICRC Treaty Database, 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/170?OpenDocument  
8Convention relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, October 18, 1907, ICRC 
Treaty Database, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/215?OpenDocument  
 
 four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and two additional Protocols signed on 8 June 
1977. The Forth Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War articulated the 
laws of armed conflict and set rules on the conduct of warfare in the annex to the 
convention.9 The Forth Hague Convention of 1907 was adopted to substitute for an 
earlier version of the Hague Convention of 1899, while it was stated that “the 
Convention of 1899 remained in force as between the Powers which signed it, and 
which do not ratify the present Convention.” 10 On the date of codification, the 
regulations set in the Forth Hague Convention of 1907 were envisaged to be 
applicable for the parties to the Convention and the violation of the regulations by a 
party would be liable to pay compensation for the acts committed by the personnel of 
its armed forces. 11 It is clear from the above cited articles of the Convention that the 
understanding of individual criminal responsibility was not present at the beginning 
of the 20th century, which evolved in time. In addition, in time the rules of the Forth 
Hague Convention of 1907 became a part of customary international law meaning 
that it is now considered to be binding for all states regardless of their status as a 
signatory or non-signatory to the Convention, which will be dealt in the following 
section. 
 
On the other hand, Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two additional 
Protocols of 1977 constitute a greater part of contemporary international 
humanitarian law in regard to the protection of victims of war, which deserves a 
14 
                                                            
9Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, October 18, 1907, ICRC Treaty 
Database, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/195?OpenDocument [Hereinafter The Forth Hague 
Convention of 1907].  
10The Forth Hague Convention of 1907, art. 4.  
11The Forth Hague Convention of 1907, art. 2 and art. 3.  
 
 detailed examination. The First Geneva Convention of 194912 is concerned with the 
protection of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field whereas, the Second 
Geneva Convention of 194913aims to protect wounded and sick in armed forces in 
naval war. These two Conventions compile the rules and regulations on the condition 
of wounded and sick that had been adopted by states back in the 19th century. In 
addition to the category of wounded and sick as the victims of war, the Third Geneva 
Convention of 194914 delineate the rules regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, 
which is a more comprehensive and detailed Convention with 143 articles compared 
to other three Geneva Conventions of 1949. Finally, the Forth Geneva Convention of 
1949 pertains to the protection of civilians in time of armed conflict. 15 The Forth 
Geneva Convention of 1949 has a significant place in the regime of international 
humanitarian law, in the sense that it is the first convention recognizing the civilians 
as the victims of war.  
 
The scope and applicability of these four Geneva Conventions of 1949 are 
described in their 2nd and 3rd articles. Article 2 common to Geneva Conventions of 
1949 states that the provisions shall be applicable “to all cases of declared war or of 
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting 
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.” The key point in 
the Common Article 2 is the wording of the article about the applicable situations. 
15 
                                                            
12Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31. [Hereinafter the First Geneva Convention of 1949].   
13Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85. [Hereinafter the Second Geneva Convention 
of 1949].  
14Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S 135.  
[Hereinafter the Third Geneva Convention of 1949].    
15Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287. [Hereinafter the Forth Geneva Convention of 1949].  
 
 The compatibility of the provision with all cases of other armed conflict in addition 
to the cases of declared war certainly extended the scope of the international 
humanitarian law. 
 
“Armed conflict” could be interpreted as any hostilities taking part between 
the parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 which brought a factual definition of 
war instead of a technical definition (McCoubrey, 1990: 24). The Kawasaki Kisen 
Kabushiki Kaisa v. Bantham Steamship Company case is an illustration of how the 
existence of war should be interpreted. This case is also significant in the sense that it 
shed light to the codification of provisions of Geneva Conventions of 1949 about the 
applicable situations. Bantham Steamship Company was a shipping company which 
hired one of its ships to a Japanese shipping company under the condition that the 
contract would be cancelled if a war breaks out involving Japan. After the invasion 
of Manchuria by Japan in 1937, the British Company sought to cancel the contract 
because of the outbreak of war between the Republic of China and the Japanese 
Empire. Although the Japanese Empire stated that the situation in China was 
indeterminate and there was no existent state of war, the English Court dealing with 
the case decided that the date of hostilities and acts should be the starting point in 
determining whether a state of war exists or not, instead of the words used by states 
or governments (McCoubrey and White, 191-192). Therefore, a declaration of war is 
not the only criteria to apply norms of international humanitarian law (McCoubrey 
and White, 1992: 192). The rules and norms of international humanitarian law 
applicable to international armed conflicts have been extended with the Additional 
16 
 
 Protocol I to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. 16 The Additional Protocol I 
“supplements the Geneva Conventions of […] 1949 for the protection of war victims 
[and applies to] the situations stated in Article 2 common to those Conventions.” 17 
In addition, the Additional Protocol I further broadens the scope of international 
humanitarian law by incorporating “armed conflicts in which people are fighting 
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the 
exercise of their right of self-determination. 18 The controversial issue of colonial 
wars’ status as wars of self-determination and the applicability of international 
humanitarian law to these situations have been resolved by the adoption of 
Additional Protocol I (McCoubrey, 1990: 25). Apparently, the Common Article 2 of 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 is applicable for all armed conflicts which have an 
international character whereas the common Article 3 of Geneva Conventions of 
1949 is applicable only to non-international armed conflicts. 
 
Therefore, the common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions declares that:  
In case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring 
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to 
the conflict shall be bound to apply as a minimum, the following 
provisions:  
1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including the 
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those 
placed hors de combat [unable to take further part in fighting] by 
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction 
founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any 
other, similar criteria. To this end the following acts are and shall 
remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with 
respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
17 
                                                            
16Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 4. [Hereinafter Additional 
Protocol I].  
17The Additional Protocol I, art.3.  
18The Additional Protocol I, art.4.  
 
 a. Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
b. Taking hostages; 
c.  Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment; 
d. The passing of sentences and carrying out of executions 
without previous judgment pronounced by a regular constituted 
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensible by civilized peoples. 
2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. 
 
Common Article 3 is important since it is the first provision referring to 
internal armed conflicts. Common Article 3 is so significant that it is sometimes 
called as a “Convention in Conventions” or “a Convention in miniature” and its mere 
existence is a major step forward in the existing international humanitarian law 
regime (Abi-Saab, 1998: 221). The first paragraph of the article enumerates all the 
categories of the victims of armed conflict; wounded, sick, prisoners of war and 
civilians, who should be treated humanely in internal armed conflicts. However, the 
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 194919 for the first time 
codified the rules solely applicable to non-international armed conflict and provided 
a broader definition of armed conflict that is not international. By developing and 
supplementing the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the 
Additional Protocol II applies to all armed conflicts, which are not in the scope of the 
Additional Protocol I and which are:  
 
taking place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its 
armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed 
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control 
over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained 
and concerted military operations. 20
 
18 
                                                            
19Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 610. [Hereinafter 
Additional Protocol II].  
20The Additional Protocol II, art. 1, para.1.   
 
 In addition, Additional Protocol II further clarifies the cases by asserting that 
the provisions of the Protocol are not applicable to all “situations of internal 
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and 
other acts of similar nature”, which are not considered as armed conflict. 21  
 
There are important interpretations on the definition and distinction of 
international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict, which were made 
by the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for Former Yugoslavia and for 
Rwanda as well as the International Court of Justice. Since those interpretations 
contributed to the clarification of Convention provisions, it is crucial to refer the 
related judgments in explaining the scope of the international humanitarian law. 
 
In the Nicaragua vs. United States of America case held before the 
International Court of Justice, the Court in its judgment evaluated the applicability of 
international humanitarian law norms in non-international armed conflicts and stated 
in its final judgment that the conflict between the contras and the Nicaraguan 
Government have a character of non-international armed conflict, whereas the acts of 
United States in and against Nicaragua state is under the category of an international 
armed conflict.22 However, the Court expressed its opinion that since the minimum 
rules applicable to the international and non-international are identical; it is pointless 
to question whether the conflict should be considered according to one category or 
the other. By referring to a previous decision on the Corfu Channel23 International 
Court of Justice once more affirmed that the rules of the Geneva Conventions of 
19 
                                                            
21The Additional Protocol II, art.1, para.2.  
22Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), para. 219. [Hereinafter the Nicaragua Case].   
23The Corfu Channel Case, (United Kingdom of Great Britain v. Northern Ireland), 1949 I.C.J. 4 
(April 9) [Hereinafter the Corfu Channel Case].   
 
 1949 establish “elementary considerations for humanity” regardless of the nature of 
the conflict as international or internal.24
  
Another significant interpretation of the scope of international humanitarian 
law in regard to the nature of the conflict was provided by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia. The defendant, Dusko Tadic, brought the decision 
of the Trail Chamber II dated August 10, 1995 to the Appeal Chamber of 
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia. One of the reasons of the 
appeal was the lack of the subject-matter of jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the case.25 
The Appellant claimed that even if the alleged crimes are proven, they were 
committed in the context of an internal armed conflict to which the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal does not extend.26 However, instead of a literal interpretation of the related 
provisions in the Statute, the Tribunal had chosen to bring a teleological 
interpretation to the forefront with an aim to reveal purposes behind the enactment of 
the Statute of the Tribunal.27 After the evaluation of the nature of the conflict, which 
had both an international and internal nature even before the establishment of the 
Tribunal, the Tribunal concluded that the members of Security Council had 
considered both aspects of the conflict while adopting the Statute and intended to 
empower the Tribunal to adjudicate violations of international humanitarian law in 
either context.28 In addition to the teleological interpretation, the Tribunal further 
clarified the extent of the Statute by interpreting specific articles of the Statute and 
evaluating international customary law, and concluded that the Tribunal has 
20 
                                                            
24The Nicaragua Case, para. 218.  
25Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, (Prosecutor v. Dusko 
Tadic a/k/a “Dule”), 1995 I.C.T.Y. (October 2) [Hereinafter the Tadic Case on Appeal ] 
26The Tadic Case on Appeal, para. 65.  
27The Tadic Case on Appeal, para. 71.  
28The Tadic Case on Appeal, para. 77. 
 
 jurisdiction over violations of international humanitarian law, such as the acts alleged 
in the indictment for Dusko Tadic, despite the fact that either they occurred in 
internal or international armed conflict.29 Furthermore, the Tribunal went beyond the 
legal explanations and clarifications of the Statute and enumerated the reasons why 
the application of international humanitarian law should be in the concern of the 
international community. The Tribunal asserted that since civil wars became more 
frequent and increasingly cruel as well as protracted, the international community 
could not ignore the legal regime applicable to these conflicts. The destabilizing 
effects of these conflicts on regional and international peace and security due to the 
increasing interdependence of states are another reason of why the international 
community should be concerned with the legal regime of these conflicts, according 
to the Tribunal. In addition, violence of a great magnitude in these conflicts dwindled 
the difference between the international and internal armed conflict and when human 
beings are concerned, the distinction between two types of conflict further loses its 
value.30
  
Another court judgment on the scope and applicability of international 
humanitarian law norms is the judgment of the Appeals Chamber of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, on the Mucic Case on Celebici Camp.31 
The grounds of the appeal, like in the Tadic Case, were based on the nature of the 
conflict and the competence of the Tribunal to prosecute and punish individuals for 
alleged crimes. The Appeals Chamber upon the investigation of relevant parts of the 
Statute of the Tribunal and the scope of the international humanitarian law, 
21 
                                                            
29The Tadic Case on Appeal, para. 137.  
30The Tadic Case on Appeal, para. 97.  
31Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (a/k/a “Pavo”), Haz’m Delic  and Esad Landzo (a/k/a 
“Zenga”), 2001 I.C.T.Y. (February 20) [Hereinafter the Mucic Case on Appeal].  
 
 concluded that since the majority of conflicts in the contemporary world are internal, 
it is contrary to the nature of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to make a distinction 
between the legal regimes applicable to international armed conflict and internal 
armed conflict, and between criminal consequences of these legal regimes. The main 
purpose of these Conventions is to protect the human dignity, which goes beyond 
any technical distinction between the nature of the conflicts.32  
 
Instead of the above cited court judgments, there are many examples of 
interpretation again from the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia 
and from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,  which could not be cited 
individually in the scope of this research. However, even the above examples prove 
that the body of international humanitarian law evolves and extends through the 
contribution of these legal mechanisms. In this sense, it is important to point out that 
these judicial decisions also constitute precedents for future cases, since they also 
accepted as the sources of international law by the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, Article 38. 
  
Under the sub-category of international conventions, agreements etc. as the 
sources of international humanitarian law, the Statutes of prior tribunals, either 
military or ad hoc, as well as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
which were enacted through international agreements are worth mentioning since 
they precisely codified the elements of international crimes that could be prosecuted 
and punished by those international enforcement mechanisms.  
 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was established upon the 
22 
                                                            
32The Macic Case on Appeal, para. 172.  
 
 London Agreement of August 8th, 1945 to try and punish the major war criminals of 
the European Axis in the Second World War and the charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal was annexed to the London Agreement.33 In the following year, another 
international military tribunal was established to try offenders of war crimes in the 
Pacific sphere of the Second World War. International Military Tribunal for Far East 
was established upon a special promulgation by the Supreme Commander of Allied 
Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, who acted in response to the directive of US 
State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee, which had been approved by all the 
occupying states later (Boister and Cryer, 2008: 22-25). Almost identically, two 
military tribunals were entitled to exercise jurisdiction over crimes against peace, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity in their charters, in Article 6 and Article 5 
respectively. The same articles also enumerated which acts constitute these crimes. 
Since they are the first international mechanisms to prosecute and punish major war 
criminals, the definition of the crimes in their statutes became a source for the latter 
ad hoc criminal tribunals.  
 
The ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and for 
Rwanda further clarified and extended the definition of the international crimes and 
their elements. The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia34 has 
jurisdiction over the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Article 2 of 
23 
                                                            
33Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 
and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, August 8, 1945, ICRC Treaty Databse, 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/350?OpenDocument [Hereinafter the Charter of Nuremberg 
Tribunal].   
34Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia 
since 1991, May 25, 1993,  ICRC Treaty Database, 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/555?OpenDocument [Hereinafter the Statute of the Tribunal for 
Former Yugoslavia]    
 
 the Statute of the Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia), violations of the laws or customs 
of war (Article 3), genocide (Article 4), crimes against humanity (Article 5). Inspired 
by the definitions provided for the crimes against humanity and acts that violate 
customs and laws of war provided by the Statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the 
Statute of the Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia established a more comprehensive and 
inclusive set of definitions for each crime. In addition, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda35 was empowered with jurisdiction over the crime of genocide 
(Article 2 of the Statute of the Tribunal for Rwanda), crimes against humanity 
(Article 3), and violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol II (Article 4). 
 
Instead of giving all the details about the elements of crimes defined in the 
statutes of the above mentioned international criminal tribunals, it would be logical 
to refer to the international crimes defined by the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court,36 since it is the first permanent enforcement mechanism of 
international criminal law without any restriction on its jurisdiction ratione loci [in 
terms of the place –i.e. territorial jurisdiction] as opposed to ad hoc Tribunals. In 
addition, Rome Statute is a valuable source in the sense that it compiles all the 
definitions and elements of crimes and establishes a single system of modern 
international humanitarian law and international criminal law. Therefore, the crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute are the crime of genocide, crimes against 
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 humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.37 Three major international 
crimes, crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are no doubt 
defined under the light of international customary law in the sixth, seventh and 
eighth articles of the Rome Statute, respectively. 
  
After explaining the primary sources of international humanitarian law, by 
respecting the ordering of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, the following section will analyze the customary rules in international 
humanitarian law. 
 
 
2.3.2. International Custom as Evidence of a General Practice Accepted as Law 
 
International custom is used to refer to a comprehensive and uniform 
repetition of behavior for a long period of time with the belief that this behavior has 
become obligatory for all states (Verri, 1992: 38). Therefore, international customary 
law is the oldest source of international law because states in the international arena 
create norms not only by their expressions through international conventions but also 
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37Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute enumerates the crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
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could not be defined during the United Nations Diplomatic Conference Plenipotentiaries on the 
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Statute due to the divergence of views among states on the definition and elements of crimes that will 
fall under the concept.  
“The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in 
accordance with the articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under 
which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be 
consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.” (Rome Statute, art. 5, 
para. 2). 
With the adoption of the Resolution 6 as a result of the 13th plenary meeting on 11 June 2010, Crime 
of Aggression was defined by consensus in accordance with the article 5, paragraph 2 of the Rome 
Statute. The definition of crime of aggression and the exercise of the jurisdiction by the Court was 
inserted to the Rome Statute as articles 8 bis, 15 bis and 15 ter respectively. According to articles 15 
bis and 15 ter “the Court shall exercise jurisdiction only with respect to crime of aggression 
committed one year after the ratification or acceptance of the amendments by thirty State Parties”. 
(ICC, Resolution RC. Res. 6, The Crime of Aggression, June 11, 2010.  
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf)  
 
 by their repetitive and persistent conduct, eventually adding a legal ground to a 
certain type of conduct (Bouchet-Saulnier, 2007: 64). Consequently, the customary 
law has two features, which are general patterns of behavior, and general acceptance 
as law (Paust et al., 1996: 4). The reason of reliance on customary norms is either to 
clarify treaty provisions or to fill the gaps in these provisions (Cassese, 2003: 28).  
 
When the issue comes to the customary international humanitarian law, the 
importance of customary rules becomes even more vital, since although there is a 
wide range of treaties, conventions or agreements that constitute the substantive 
element of humanitarian law comprehensively, there are still grave breaches of 
humanitarian law norms in many international and non-international armed conflicts. 
The general belief among the experts of international humanitarian law is that non-
compliance with the norms does not drive from the inadequacy of written rules; 
instead the reasons are the unwillingness to respect the norms, ineffectiveness to 
enforce them and vagueness in certain provisions’ applicability (Henckaerts, 2005: 
176). Especially, two important problems occur in the application of humanitarian 
law norms. The first one is the applicability of the conventions to solely signatory 
states that have ratified the conventions. This situation brings an ambiguity in 
implementation since different conventions might be operative in different conflicts 
in accordance with the states as parties to the conflict (Henckaerts, 2005: 177). The 
second impediment for the implementation of rules is the distinction between 
international and non-international armed conflict and the lack of adequate and 
detailed provisions for internal armed conflicts as opposed to international armed 
conflicts (Henckaerts, 2005:176). However, certain provisions of humanitarian law 
have universal concerns in terms of protecting the lives of individuals, and the 
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 violations of them have consequences for all humanity which make humanitarian law 
a universal custom, binding for all states regardless of their ratification or non-
ratification of a particular treaty or convention (Kasto, 1994: 40-41). Non-ratification 
or non-recognition of the rules of humanitarian law do not jeopardize the universally 
binding nature of them as being customary law norms accepted as law by the 
majority of states (Kasto, 1994: 42). 
 
Since customary norms are believed to apply to all people and binding for all 
states even if a particular state is not a party to a convention, to delineate the scope of 
customary international humanitarian law is very essential to avoid any legal gap that 
would benefit the perpetrators of humanitarian law violations. 
  
There are two features of customary international law, general pattern of 
behavior or state practice and general acceptance as law or opinio juris. In regard to 
customary humanitarian law, state practice could be determined by taking into 
account both physical and verbal acts of states. Battlefield behavior, use of certain 
weapons, treatment of different categories of people could be counted under physical 
acts, whereas verbal acts are military manuals, national legislation, instructions to 
security and armed forces, statements in the international fora, government positions 
on conventions and resolutions adopted by international organizations (Henckaerts, 
2005: 179). General acceptance as law, or opino juris, on the other hand, is more 
intricate to determine compared to state practice especially in the area of 
humanitarian law. Many provisions of humanitarian law actually forbid certain 
conduct in warfare, and to claim that there is a general acceptance as law for these 
provisions, it should be proved that any avoidance from such prohibited acts is a 
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 consequence of legal conviction instead of a coincidence (Henckaerts, 2005: 182). 
However, it should be noted that the importance of proving the existence of opino 
juris diminishes when there is abundant uniform state practice. On the contrary, if 
there is an ambiguity and inharmony in state practice, the existence of opino juris 
becomes vital to claim that certain conduct and prohibition of it is custom 
(Henckaerts, 2005: 182). The existence of general acceptance as law could be 
derived from several convention provisions and court judgments interpreting the 
scope of humanitarian law. 
  
In the Preamble of the Second Hague Convention of 1899, it was stated that; 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war issued, the High 
Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not 
included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and 
belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the 
principles of international law, as they result from the usage 
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, 
and the requirements of the public conscience38
 
 
This clause is also known as “the Martens Clause”, taking its name from the 
Russian Delegate to the Hague Peace Conference, jurist F.F. de Martens, who had 
proposed the inclusion of this clause in the convention (Meron, 2006: 17). The 
Clause is important in the sense that it aims to cover situations that are not provided 
in the Convention and to avoid undermining the customary law status of matters 
(Meron, 2006: 18). Especially in humanitarian law, it is highly significant to prevent 
any case in which a person could not benefit from protection and assistance of norms 
because of any omissions in the written law (Bouchet-Saulnier, 2007: 65). So the 
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concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, ICRC Treaty Database 
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 place and importance of customary international law is worth emphasizing 
repeatedly. The Martens Clause also included in the Forth Hague Convention of 
1907 with only minor changes in its wording. Later, the fundamentals of Martens 
Clause, i.e. usages established among civilized people, the laws of humanity and the 
requirements of public conscience were adopted by the four Geneva Conventions of 
1949. Article 63 of the First Geneva Convention of 1949 asserts that:  
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall be at liberty to denounce 
the present Convention. […] The denunciation shall have effect 
only in respect of the denouncing Power. It shall in no way impair 
the obligations which the Parties to the conflict shall remain bound 
to fulfill by virtue of the principles of the laws of nations, as they 
result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from 
the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.39  
 
 
 The aim under the incorporation of the Martens Clause to the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 is to ensure that even if a party denounces the Conventions, it 
will still have duties and obligations according to the customary international law 
norms (Meron, 2006: 19). Therefore, the clause underlines the value of norms of 
humanitarian law as generally accepted rules and as a part of customary international 
law. A similar clause, emphasizing the principles of international law derived from 
established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public 
conscience has been incorporated to the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 to safeguard the protection of victims of warfare in cases not 
covered by the Protocol.40
  
 In addition to the above convention articles, there are important court 
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 judgments that shed light to the question of customary law status of international 
humanitarian law norms. The very first example is the judgment of the International 
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.41 While evaluating the law relating to war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, contrary to the opposition by defense that Hague 
Conventions of 1907 and Geneva Conventions of 1929 are not applicable in German 
case because of the fact that the belligerents were not a party to these conventions, 
the Tribunal declared that “by 1939 these rules laid down in the Conventions were 
recognized by all civilized nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the 
laws and customs of war.” 
  
 Another court interpretation of the customary status of humanitarian law is 
the decision of the Appeals Chamber of International Criminal Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia on Tadic case. The Tribunal asserted that many provisions of the 
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 could be regarded “as 
declaratory of existing rules or as having crystallized emerging rules of customary 
law or else as having been strongly instrumental in their evolution as general 
principles”.42 This decision is consequential in the sense that it acknowledges 
customary rule status of many provisions of the Additional Protocol II, which is a 
relatively novel convention compared to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Another 
example could be the judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda on 
Kayishema Case.43 The Tribunal asserted that the crime of genocide is considered as 
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 part of customary international law and a norm of jus cogens44, meaning that any 
other international law inconsistent with prohibition of genocide will be void (Paust 
et al., 1996: 5). The last but not least example of a court decision confirming the 
customary law status of humanitarian law is the judgment of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda on Akayesu Case.45 The Tribunal argued that the 
status of the common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 is accepted as 
customary international law by most states through citing the interpretation of 
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia in the Tadic Case.46  
 
 After delineating the scope of the international humanitarian law, in treaty 
law and in customary law, the following section will try to focus on the 
implementation and enforcement of the international humanitarian law norms and the 
criminal aspects of international law.  
 
 
2.4. Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law  
 
 Enforcement refers to the criminal processes such as the prosecution, trial and 
punishment of individuals responsible for violations of international humanitarian 
law norms. Therefore, the enforcement of these norms falls under the category of 
international criminal law. Although there is not a plain distinction between 
international humanitarian law and international criminal law, and although these 
two concepts most of the time are used interchangeably, in the scope of this research, 
international criminal law is defined as follows; 
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 “International Criminal Law is a body of rules designed both 
to proscribe international crimes and to impose upon states 
the obligation to prosecute and punish at least some of those 
crimes. It also regulates international proceedings for 
prosecuting and trying persons accused of such crimes.” 
(Cassese, 2003: 15). 
  
 
 Throughout the evolution of the humanitarian law norms towards 
criminalization, the international criminal law emerged as a convergence of two 
disciplines; which are the international aspects of national criminal law and the penal 
aspects of international law (Paust et al., 1996: 3). International aspects of national 
criminal law are enforcement obligations assumed by individual states through 
customary law and international treaties. There are two options available to states to 
realize their obligations. They would either domesticate international legal provisions 
by ratifying conventions and then prosecute individuals and assist other states or 
directly incorporate international law for criminal proceedings to their national 
criminal system (Paust et al., 1996: 15). The penal aspects of international law, on 
the other hand includes the international crimes that are created by treaties and 
customary law and the enforcement of these rules directly by international 
mechanisms (Paust et al., 1996: 3). However, prosecution of violations of 
international humanitarian law requires individual criminal responsibility assigned to 
international crimes (Goldstone and Smith, 2009: 13). The early codification efforts 
on humanitarian law, i.e. the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions did not have any 
provision appointing individual criminal responsibility for the breaches of provisions 
(Wolfrum, 1995: 519). Although there were early examples of prosecution, the 
responsibility of individuals in those early prosecutions were not the same as the 
individual responsibility in today’s modern international criminal law. Prior to 
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 Second World War, individuals were convicted not because of responsibility as an 
individual but as a representative or legal personification of state (Goldstone and 
Smith, 2009: 14). It was after the Nuremberg proceedings, which will be examined 
below, and after the prosecution of German war criminals that individual 
responsibility for international crimes evolved in the system of international criminal 
justice. Trying to rely upon the above definition of international criminal law, this 
section evaluates the enforcement of humanitarian law provisions under two sub-
categories, national enforcement and international enforcement.  
 
 
2.4.1. National Enforcement 
 
 Recalling from the above explanations, national implementation stands for 
the duty and obligation of individual states to prosecute and punish grave breaches of 
humanitarian law. State responsibility to prosecute, try and punish individuals 
derives from the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, in which it was stated that;  
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation 
necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons 
committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches 
of the present Convention defined in the following Article. 
 
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search 
for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be 
committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, 
regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if 
it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own 
legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High 
Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party 
has made out a prima facie (evidence) case.47
 
 
 It is evident from the first two paragraphs of the article that international 
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 criminal law was enforceable by only states party to the Geneva Conventions of 
1949. Especially, the second paragraph of the article indicates that it is not only the 
duty of the home state to the transgressions of humanitarian law but also “the ability 
to investigate and prosecute is left open to [all] other states” (Wolfrum, 1995: 523). 
When reading the above article, the emphasis should be put on the words “regardless 
of their nationality.” The phrase is important in the sense that it signifies the 
universality of state jurisdiction over international crimes. The principle of 
universality could be defined as the empowerment of any state to bring individuals to 
trial regardless of their nationality and of the place where the alleged crimes 
committed (Cassese, 2003: 284).  In addition, this power of individual states stems 
from the nature of the crime since certain international crimes are believed to be 
under universal jurisdiction because the perpetrators are hostes humani generis 
[enemies of humankind] (McCoubrey and White, 1992: 333). 
 
A well-known example of the exercise of universal jurisdiction is the 
Eichmann Case.48 Adolf Eichmann was captured in Argentina and brought to trial in 
Israel. He was tried under the Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law; in which it was 
stated that persons who committed a crime against the Jewish people, a crime against 
humanity, war crimes are liable to death penalty (Oliver, 1962: 805). When the 
crimes considered under the Nazi Collaborators Law of Israel National Criminal 
Law, it is apparent that Israel, as envisaged in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
enacted necessary legislation to try individuals accused of international crimes. Thus, 
Israel brought the case before its national court regardless of the nationality of the 
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 offender and the location of the crime. The Court, upon the rejection of Counsel for 
Eichmann on the jurisdiction of Israel, declared that the state of Israel has the power 
to exercise jurisdiction because of the universal character of the crime and because of 
the universality of the authority to try these crimes under international law (Oliver, 
1962: 808). 
  
Another illustrious example of universal jurisdiction is the Pinochet Case. 
Augusto Pinochet was indicted by Madrid’s National Courthouse by a Spanish judge, 
Baltasar Garzon on the charges of torture, terrorism and genocide. Judge Garzon 
demanded Pinochet’s extradition from England (Lagos and Munoz, 1999: 26). The 
warrant of arrest was based on a domestic criminal code of Spain; the appeals 
chamber of the Audencia Nacional upon the discussions on the validity of the 
jurisdiction of the Spanish court affirmed that Spain has the authority to exercise 
jurisdiction because of the alleged crime in the case i.e. genocide (Goldstone and 
Smith, 2008: 116-117). The Hause of Lords, a part of the parliament and also the 
United Kingdom’s highest court, dealt with the case and interpreted the jurisdiction 
of the United Kingdom to realize the extradition of Pinochet to Spain and concluded 
that the extradition could be proceeded (Goldstone and Smith, 2008: 117-118). 
However, due to the poor health of Pinochet, the British Home Office, which is the 
institution to give the final decision in the extradition matter, declared its decision 
that Pinochet was free to turn to Chile in March 2000 (Goldstone and Smith, 2008: 
118). Regardless of the result, the arrest and extradition proceedings of Pinochet in 
England were a proof of the exercise of the universality of jurisdiction (Meron, 2006: 
92). Next I examine international enforcement in more detail since the main purpose 
of this research is to find out the impact of international mechanisms on 
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 implementing international criminal law.  
 
 
2.4.2. International Enforcement 
 
 In the early 20th century, convention provisions on the repression of violations 
of humanitarian law were declarative and enforceable by only states whereas after 
the end of Second World War, we have witnessed a more progressive approach in the 
enforcement of humanitarian law by the establishment of International Military 
Tribunals. Consequently, International criminal law became binding on states, 
individuals and other actors and enforceable directly by international tribunals (Paust 
et al., 1996: 12). When the provisions of international conventions on the 
humanitarian law are examined, the first reference of an international tribunal was 
made in Genocide Convention of 1948.49 It was stated that persons charged of 
genocide or other acts in the conventions shall be tried by a competent court of a 
State or by an international penal tribunal.50
 
 At the end of the First World War the prosecution and punishment of war 
criminals was an agenda item at the preparatory meetings of the Paris Peace 
Conference, and the Treaty of Versailles had some provisions on the punishment of 
individuals, particularly Germans and their allies, by a military tribunal of the Allied 
Powers. However, the German Emperor, Kaiser was not to be prosecuted in a 
criminal sense because of the opposition mainly by the United States that the 
responsibility of Heads of States to such a greater extent is unprecedented and 
36 
                                                            
49Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, December 9, 1948, ICRC 
Treaty Database http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/357?OpenDocument [Hereinafter Genocide 
Covention of 1948].   
50Genocide Convention of 1948, art. 6.  
 
 against national sovereignty (Beigbeder, 1999: 28). Rather, Kaiser was to be charged 
with an offence against international morality and the trial would be a political one, 
not a judicial one as we have observed in the modern enforcement mechanism of 
international criminal law (Beigbeder, 1999: 28).  However, this attempt failed due to 
the refusal of the German government to surrender perpetrators of war crimes; 
instead they were tried and punished by the Supreme Court of the German Reich 
(Wolfrum, 1995: 520). 
 
 The following years, there were attempts to establish an international criminal 
court by the League of Nations, but due to political pressure and lack of interest, 
these attempts ended up fruitlessly (Goldstone and Smith, 2008: 29). So many draft 
statutes of the proposed international criminal court were prepared either by the 
League of Nations’ organs or non-governmental organizations. For example, in 1920 
“Advisory Committee of Jurists” proposed that the Permanent Court of Justice to be 
established should also be empowered to try crimes that are “breaches of 
international public order or against the universal law of nations” (Cassese, 2003: 
328). However, the proposal was repudiated by the Assembly of League of Nations 
(Cassese, 2006: 329). Examples of other attempts by non-governmental 
organizations in the inter-war period could be the draft statutes prepared by Inter-
Parliamentary Union or International Law Association (Cassese, 2003: 329). 
Unfortunately, only after the devastation of Second World War, the enforcement of 
international humanitarian law norms was seriously brought to the agenda of 
international community, which produced the result of the establishment of two 
international military tribunals. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
and its charter are so significant that they preceded all later international mechanisms 
37 
 
 both in terms of jurisdiction and in rules and procedures. The historical development 
of war crimes trials at Nuremberg was composed of several intergovernmental 
conferences between the Allied Powers, especially between the United States, United 
Kingdom and Soviet Union. The Tehran Conference in 1943 and the Yalta and 
Potsdam Conferences of 1945 set up the foundations of the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg (Goldstone and Smith, 2008: 42). At the last meeting 
between the non-heads of states in London, the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal was released on 8 August 1945, which was also known as London Charter 
or Nuremberg Charter51 (Goldstone and Smith, 2008: 42).  As also mentioned in the 
previous section, the International Military Tribunal for Far East, which was 
established upon the executive order of Supreme Commander of Allied Powers and 
release of the Charter of the Tribunal in 1946 (Cassese, 2003: 332). These two 
international military tribunals, along with the criticisms directed at the 
establishment, procedures and jurisdiction of them, were successful in demonstrating 
that international crimes could be punished by international mechanisms. In addition, 
Nuremberg Trials established a common understanding in the international criminal 
law that individuals who planned, executed or assisted international crimes are 
accountable as the ones who committed them. Consequently, orders from superior 
authorities could not be accepted as an excuse for the commission of crime 
(McCoubrey, 1990: 217). Furthermore, Nuremberg Trials set a precedent for future 
trials and contributed to the preparation of the draft statute of the International 
Criminal Court by the International Law Commission (Beigbeder, 1999: 49). 
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 The Cold War period was also an infertile era for the enforcement of 
international criminal law. Apart from some abortive attempts of the International 
Law Commission to draft a statute of international criminal court in 1950s, the whole 
Cold War years passed with some examples of national prosecutions of international 
crimes without any realization of an international mechanism to prosecute and punish 
those crimes. (Cassese, 2003: 334). Decades passed without any incentive to 
prosecute and punish perpetrators of large scale human rights violations and this 
created a culture of impunity and “indeed impunity became a rule rather than 
exception.” (Mennecke, 2007: 321). For example, Idi Amin (Ugandan Head of State 
between 1971 and 1979), Mengistu Haile Mariam (Ethiopian Head of State between 
1971 and 1991), Pol Pot (Cambodian Prime Minister between 1975 and 1979) and 
many other tyrants in the Cold War era were not held accountable for their crimes. 
(Akhavan, 2001: 13). One reason for small number of prosecutions even after the end 
of the Cold War could be attributed to the fact that “impunity became the political 
price to secure an end to the violent conflicts.” (Bassiouni, 1996: 12). 
 
 Immediately after the end of the Cold War, ethnic conflicts in the Balkans 
and Africa again diverted the attention of the international community to the 
atrocities in these conflicts and grave breaches of international humanitarian law 
provisions. To address the atrocities in the territory of Former Yugoslavia, the United 
Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 827 for the establishment of an 
international tribunal for prosecuting the persons responsible for violations of 
humanitarian law.52 This resolution is worth examining in many aspects. First of all, 
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 it was the first in the history of international enforcement of humanitarian law that an 
international mechanism was established in the actual time of conflicts, as opposed to 
the previous examples of Nuremberg and Tokyo, which were established at the end 
of hostilities. Another significant point is that the Security Council considered the 
situation in the Former Yugoslavia under article 2, paragraph 7 and Chapter 7 of the 
United Nations Charter to maintain international peace and security, which had been 
threatened by the conflicts in Balkans. Instead of establishing such an organ by an 
international agreement, upon the Secretary General’s advice, the Security Council 
chose to establish the Tribunal with a resolution in order not to waste time with 
negotiations for an international agreement. This is also another important aspect 
since it set a precedent regardless of the debates on the powers of Security Council to 
establish such an organ because of the wide support among member states for the 
Tribunal (Alpkaya, 2002: 41). However, even more importantly at the beginning 
sentences of the resolution, the Security Council declared its aim to put an end to 
violations of humanitarian law and argued that the establishment of an ad hoc 
international tribunal and prosecution of individuals would realize the achievement 
of this aim and contribute to restoration of peace. Therefore, at the initial stage of 
establishment, there was the aim of ending atrocities with an implicit assumption that 
the existence of the tribunal would deter future violations of humanitarian law. In 
line with the same argumentation, the Security Council again by Resolution 955 
established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda considering the issue 
under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter.53 While aiming to put an end to 
atrocities and bring the persons accused of international crimes committed in the 
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 territory of Rwanda to justice, the implicit conviction was that the existence of the 
tribunal would serve to terminate atrocities and deter future ones. It was asserted in 
the Resolution that “the prosecution of persons responsible for the genocide and 
other violations of international humanitarian law will contribute to ensuring that 
such violations are halted and effectively addressed.” In addition to the 
predetermined impact, i.e. deterrence, of the ad hoc Tribunals at the establishment 
stage, the Tribunals themselves asserted the intention to have a deterrent effect while 
sentencing the criminals. In the Kayishema Case, International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda asserted that the Tribunal imposes sentences on convicted persons for 
retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and to protect the society. In addition, for 
deterrence the Tribunal seeks to dissuade the ones who would tempt to commit such 
crimes.54 In Akeyasu Case Sentencing Judgment, the Tribunal argued that the 
penalties should be imposed upon the individual for retribution and for discouraging 
the ones who would have an intention to commit such crimes by referring to the aims 
of the Security Council in establishing the Tribunal explicitly.55
 
The International Criminal Court for Former Yugoslavia also makes 
references to the purpose of deterrence in Sentencing Judgments. To illustrate, in 
Erdemovic Case, the Tribunal expressed that in sentencing it believes the most 
important concepts are deterrence and retribution along with stigmatization of the 
offender.56 Another example could be the Sentencing Judgment of the Tadic Case. 
The Tribunal expressed its opinion that retribution and deterrence are the primary 
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 purposes of sentence.57
 
While the international community was trying to respond to the atrocities on 
an ad hoc basis in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, throughout 1990s, the ideas 
of establishing a permanent international criminal court were retrieved. In 1989, the 
United Nations General Assembly, asked the International Law Commission to 
address the establishment of an international criminal court, which was followed by 
the General Assembly’s request of the preparation of a draft statute for the 
international criminal court from the International Law Commission in 1993 
(Goldstone and Smith, 2008: 110). Already continuing efforts to address the 
establishment of an international criminal court had been accelerated by the 
establishment of International Criminal Court for Former Yugoslavia which signified 
the desirability of an international criminal court and existence of political will to 
establish an international criminal court and by the above referred request of the 
General Assembly (Hebel, 1999: 30). International Law Commission finished the 
draft statute and recommended to the General Assembly to convene an international 
conference to discuss the issues arising from the statute and to adopt a Statute for 
ICC, however, only a minority of states welcomed a Diplomatic Conference in 1995, 
instead majority of states argued that before a conference to be convened there 
should be some preparatory work (Hebel, 1999: 31). Therefore, the General 
Assembly established an ad hoc Committee to review the issues in the draft statute 
and Annual Preparatory Meetings were held, which prepared the grounds of the 
assembly of the Rome Conference in 1998 (Goldstone and Smith 2008: 111). On 15 
June 1998 the Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of International Criminal 
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 Court was opened in Rome by the participation of 160 states and some working 
committees were established to discuss different aspects of the Statute (Hebel, 1999: 
36-37). On 17 July 1998 by the assenting votes of 120 states, the Rome Statute was 
adopted and on 1 July 2002 the Rome Statute entered into force after the ratification 
of 60 states. As of 21st July 2009, 110 states ratified and became part to the Rome 
Statute.58 The reason of abortive attempts to establish a permanent international 
criminal court over the past 50 years was obviously the understanding of sovereignty 
and independence among states that closely correlates the power to prosecute and 
punish and sovereignty. Therefore, states were unwilling to hand over their power 
and limit their sovereignty to an international body till the beginning of 21st century 
(Aksar, 2003: 217). 
 
Deterrence was also an objective in the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court. United Nations Office of Legal Affairs declared in the establishment 
process of the Court that “effective deterrence is the primary objective” whereas 
United Nations General Assembly’s president at the ceremony of the entry into force 
of Rome Statute stated that “a permanent institution will provide stronger deterrence 
to potential offenders” (Mennecke, 2007: 322). 
 
In the preamble of the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court it was 
also avowed that the state parties to the Rome Statute are “determined to put an end 
to impunity for the perpetrators of [international] crimes and thus to contribute to the 
prevention of such crimes.”59 The reference was again made to the retributive and 
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 deterrent aspects of punishment as an aim of international enforcement. 
 
Therefore, the primary goal of international criminal justice system is to 
address atrocities and retribution, while the secondary goal is to manage conflict and 
reduce the likelihood of future violations by deterring potential offenders (Rudolph, 
2001: 656). However, it should be noted that there are also other aims of prosecution 
at the international level, such as ensuring justice, respecting international law, 
avoiding or preventing personal vengeance, de-legitimizing leaders and national 
reconciliation but for many legal scholars, practitioners and policy makers; 
deterrence is the most important aim of the international criminal justice system 
(Wippman, 1999: 474). Therefore, it is essential to refer to the criminology literature 
to reveal the assumptions of the deterrence theory for national criminal justice 
system, since all above aims of international enforcement mechanisms are a 
reflection of domestic criminal systems.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THEORY OF DETERRENCE 
 
 
 
As discussed above, the main purpose of the international community in 
establishing international courts as a response to grave human rights violations and 
atrocities committed against civilians during either an international or a civil war was 
to deter probable future atrocities. The Security Council resolutions establishing 
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the Rome 
Statute have references to the deterrence objective. In addition, contrary to the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals, the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda and since 2004 the International Criminal Court have been involved in 
ongoing conflicts and is expected to have a deterrent effect and to contribute to the 
reduction of human rights violations during war time. However, the question of 
punishment and its deterrent effect on potential or actual de facto offenders is an 
issue which has been widely discussed in “the literature of criminology”.  
 
Before trying for an attempt to answer the question of whether the 
mechanisms of international criminal justice system have a deterrent effect in 
averting probable future atrocities, it is essential to scrutinize the theory of 
deterrence. Moreover, besides this necessity, deterrence theory also provides policy 
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 implications for the suppression of crimes and prevention of them, which might be 
operative in improving the future implementation of international humanitarian law.  
 
 
3.1. Classical Theory of Deterrence  
 
Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794) and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) are 
considered to be the founders of the theory of deterrence who were both utilitarian 
and concerned with the formulation of legal and penal reform instead of an 
explanation of criminal behavior (Akers and Sellers, 2009: 17). Among different 
theories of punishment, Bentham and Beccaria are cited under utilitarian approaches 
to punishment since they tried to lay down the purpose of punishment and conditions 
that a punishment can be considered as legitimate. Both authors stated that the 
legitimacy of punishment depends on the benefit that this punishment provides to the 
society (Donmezer, 1965: 60-61). Plus, the benefit of the punishment is implicit in its 
deterrent effect for future crimes through intimidation (Donmezer, 1965: 57). 
 
There are also works of political economists who have contributed to the 
theory of deterrence in criminology such as Becker (1968) and Harris (1970) who 
had explained the involvement in crime and decision making process in accordance 
with the rational actor in economics. So, the classical deterrence theory presupposes 
individual as a rational actor and assumes that before committing a crime an 
individual goes through a rational decision making process and makes a choice 
between the costs and benefits of his/her prospective action and decides whether to 
commit that crime. Therefore, the main rationale behind deterrence theory is that 
actors commit crime if they think that committing crime is to their advantage or in 
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 other words; the benefits of crime exceeds the costs, legal consequences and risks of 
committing it (Cullen and Agnew, 2001: 293).  
 
There are three important components of deterrence theory, which are the 
severity, certainty and the celerity of punishment. The severity of punishment does 
not involve an underlying idea of “an eye to eye, tooth to tooth” but assumes that the 
punishment should be severe enough to eliminate the gain or benefit offered by the 
commission of crime (Akers and Sellers, 2009: 18). The basic assumption of the 
theory, then, is that there is a negative relation between the crime rates and severity 
of punishment. Moreover, the theory also assumes the same negative relation 
between the certainty of punishment and crime rates. The certainty of punishment 
refers to the probability of arrest and imposition of punishment (Akers and Sellers, 
2009: 19). Lastly, the celerity of punishment is germane to the swiftness with which 
the punishment is imposed after the committal of crime and again the theory assumes 
that the more swift the punishment the more deterrent it would be (Akers and Sellers, 
2009: 19). As a result, the classical deterrence theory claims that the best way to 
prevent or control punishment is to increase severity, certainty and celerity of 
punishment. 
 
There is also a commonly accepted distinction between general and specific 
deterrence in the literature. Specific deterrence puts forward the idea that 
“apprehended and punished offenders will refrain from repeating crimes if they are 
certainly caught and severely punished” (Akers and Sellers, 2009: 19). The general 
deterrence, on the other hand, represents the idea that punishment of an offender 
would serve as an example to those in general public who have not committed a 
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 crime and would create sufficient fear to deter them from committing a heinous act 
(Akers and Sellers, 2009: 19). Pioneer scholars of the theory of general deterrence 
such as Pufendorf and Feuerbach argued that the respect for the laws and norms in a 
society is attained through the threat that punishment presents (Donmezer, 1965: 60). 
The specific deterrence theory aims to prevent offenders from recidivism whereas 
general deterrence aims to prevent emergence of new offenders. Morris (1966: 632) 
made the distinction between specific and general deterrence by stating that “specific 
deterrence thus considers punishment in the microcosm of the group of convicted 
criminals [whereas] [g]eneral deterrence looks to the macrocosm of the society as a 
whole”. However, it is possible to claim that both types of deterrence theory try to 
change the behavior of individual by the unpleasant consequences of legal sanctions 
which Zimring and Hawkins (1973: 75) explained as simple deterrence. Also 
Beccaria stated that the punishment should be in accordance with the crime and 
should have the power to change the behavior of an individual, who has an 
inclination to commit the same crime (Becarria, 1764: 213-214). Therefore, as 
Toroslu indicated punishment not only assumes a role of regulator and protector of 
the social order, but also has a role in affecting and changing the social life (Toroslu, 
2008: 18-19).  
 
 
3.2. Re-conceptualization of the Theory  
 
However, more recent studies of deterrence have started to deliberate on the 
role of the perceptions of individuals on the certainty and severity of punishment 
rather than actual certainty in terms of arrest rates or actual severity in terms of years 
of punishment in sentence, fines etc. The main reason of investigating the 
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 perceptions of certainty and severity is that the individuals’ behavior is mostly 
influenced by the perceptions rather than actual certainty and punishment because as 
Buikhuisen (1988: 185) also indicates, there might be and usually there is a lack of 
knowledge in the public about the actual punishment and there is a gap between the 
actual punishment and expected punishment. The extension of deterrence theory with 
the incorporation of perceptions as a determining factor in individual behavior and 
decision making process was realized in the 70s and 80s and attracted much more 
scholarly attention in the consequent years. The primary hypothesis on perceptions 
predicts an inverse relationship between perceptions on severity and certainty of 
punishment and the involvement in crime; as it was the same case in the relationship 
between actual severity and certainty of punishment and deterrent effect of 
punishment in classical theory. 
 
Williams and Hawkins’ (1986) re-conceptualization of deterrence theory by 
making a distinction between legal and extra-legal sanctions offered an expansion in 
the theory that goes beyond the seldom consideration of legal sanction threats. While 
examining preventive mechanisms of sanctions, Williams and Hawkins suggested 
that stigma of arrest (social degradation and loss of respect due to being caught), 
commitment costs (cost of arrest for future goals) and attachment costs (loss of 
friends due to being caught) are perceptual factors, which can be seen as part of a 
deterrent effect in criminal involvement (Williams and Hawkins, 1986: 562). 
Therefore the consideration of these extra-legal influences affects the decision 
making process in committing a crime. The divergence from the deterrence theory 
stems from authors’ suggestion that even if there is low severity and certainty 
perception of punishment, an individual might still refrain from committing a crime 
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 because of his/her anticipation of stigmatizing reactions from others (Williams and 
Hawkins, 1986: 563). Also concerns about future employment, education or marriage 
opportunities again intervene in the decision making process, which are labeled as 
commitment costs. General deterrence occurs when these concerns about the future 
are thought to be jeopardized (Williams and Hawkins, 1986: 565). In addition, the 
perception of how the relationship with close friends and relatives would be affected 
is the last term that should be examined when understanding criminal involvement 
and deterrence according to the authors. They argued that when arrest is perceived to 
damage relations with others, then it would have deterrent effect (Williams and 
Hawkins, 1986: 564). Therefore, the authors concluded that these three indirect 
consequences (stigma, commitment and attachment) promote deterrence, thus, theory 
of deterrence should be expanded and enhanced in this direction (Williams and 
Hawkins, 1986: 568). 
 
Since the deterrence process is mostly characterized by the evaluation of the 
actor as a rational calculator of risks and benefit, some of the studies of deviance and 
policy options for crime control centered on rational choice theory. Cornish and 
Clarke’s (1987) article is another contribution to the literature of criminology which 
presents a reconsideration of rational choice theory and its implication for deterring 
crime. According to the authors; “decision process and the factors that are taken into 
account are likely to vary greatly at the different stages of decision making and 
among different crimes” and consequently they proposed a crime-specific analysis of 
criminal choices as well as an assessment of decisions at different stages of 
involvement separately (Cornish and Clarke, 1987: 933). Cornish and Clarke 
suggested that specific crimes are committed for specific purposes and the decision 
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 to offend is affected by both the characteristics of the offender and the offences in 
which the interaction of these characteristics plays an important role in the 
calculation of risks and benefits (Cornish and Clarke, 1987: 935). Therefore, 
especially the properties of offenses which are the type and the amount of payoff, 
perceived risk and skills needed become the factors that structure the choice of the 
offender (Cornish and Clarke, 1987: 935). Authors labeled these factors as “choice 
structuring properties” which they defined as “a relational concept designed to 
provide an analytic tool for increasing an understanding of the interaction between 
personal variables and arrays of behaviors […] [and] to specify more closely 
offenders and the offenses they commit” (Cornish and Clarke, 1987: 943). 
 
On the other hand, Nagin and Pogarsky proposed a new model for the 
traditional deterrence theory which incorporates impulsivity and extralegal sanctions 
too (Nagin and Pogarsky, 2001: 865). In formulating their model, authors aimed to 
test an integrated deterrence theory with its all components of certainty, severity and 
celerity (Nagin and Pogarsky, 2001: 870). Their predictions in the model were as 
follows; the greater the certainty and severity is, the more they would have a 
deterrent effect and the longer the delay to the punishment the less it would deter 
(Nagin and Pogarsky, 2001: 873). The authors also tested their model with a survey 
among undergraduate students whose details will be provided in the next section. 
 
Another important and robust re-conceptualization of deterrence theory was 
made by Stafford and Warr (1993). The authors aimed to re-conceptualize specific 
and general deterrence and proposed new variables that are effective in deterrence 
process such as; punishment avoidance and direct vs. indirect/vicarious experiences. 
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 They stated that the key factor in the conception of deterrence in the literature of 
criminology is the conventional distinction between the general and specific 
deterrence and argued that the general deterrence in the literature is defined as the 
effect of punishment on the general public and specific deterrence is defined as the 
effect of punishment on the offenders (Stafford and Warr, 1993: 123). Stafford and 
Warr (1993: 124) challenged this distinction between the general and specific 
deterrence and claimed that “the conventional distinction between general and 
specific deterrence rests on faulty logic and it has done little to clarify the deterrence 
process”. The authors argued when considering general deterrence on people who 
have never suffered from punishment the researchers ignore the fact that there are 
two groups of people under this category; one group is the people who have never 
committed a crime and so never faced a punishment and the other group involves the 
people who have committed a crime but avoided punishment (Stafford and Warr, 
1993: 124). For the second group of people who have never faced punishment but 
actually committed a crime, authors used the concept of punishment avoidance and 
claimed that these people have actually an experience with punishment avoidance 
and this affects their perception of certainty of punishment (Stafford and Warr, 1993: 
124). They also asserted that it is possible that punishment avoidance encourages the 
committal of crime more than the experience with punishment discourages it 
(Stafford and Warr, 1993: 125). 
  
In addition to punishment avoidance as a factor in deterrence process, authors 
also introduced a distinction between the experiences of individuals about the 
punishment and punishment avoidance which is the distinction between the direct 
and indirect experiences. Stafford and Warr (1993: 126) claimed that many scholars 
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 considered the direct experiences punishment as the only operative factor in future 
crime involvement. However, they argued that individuals have a mixture of direct 
and indirect experiences of punishment and punishment avoidance in the sense that 
they would also acquire knowledge or have a belief about the situation and 
experiences of others who have committed the same crimes (Stafford and Warr, 
1993: 126). They claimed that indirect experiences of punishment or punishment 
avoidance play also a determining role in one’s calculations of the possibility of 
arrest. They illustrated this effect with a hypothetical situation in which the arrest of 
a fellow offender would lead a conclusion that the risk of arrest has increased 
(Stafford and Warr, 1993: 127).  
 
Depending upon these new enhancements in deterrence theory, Stafford and 
Warr (1993: 127) re-conceptualized general and specific deterrence as follows: 
“general deterrence refers to the deterrent effect of indirect experience of punishment 
and punishment avoidance whereas specific deterrence refers to the deterrent effect 
of direct experiences of punishment and punishment avoidance”.    
Stafford and Warr also elaborated on the possible application of this new 
conceptualization in deterrence research. They argued that this new 
conceptualization acknowledges that both general and specific deterrence might be 
relevant for any individual from any categorization either from the category of the 
ones who have never faced punishment or from the category of the ones who have 
experienced punishment (Stafford and Warr, 1993: 127). The introduction of 
punishment avoidance as a variable in the deterrence research was another 
contribution according to authors because “although deterrence researchers treat 
criminal behavior as a consequence of the perceived certainty of legal punishment, it 
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 is possible that criminal behavior may be the cause of such perceptions” (Stafford 
and Warr, 1993: 129). Lastly, Stafford and Warr concluded that it is unnecessary to 
have two separate theories of general and specific deterrence; rather it is possible to 
have a single theory focusing on the direct and indirect experiences of individuals 
with punishment and punishment avoidance (Stafford and Warr, 1993: 133).  
 
Paternoster and Piquero (1995) have elaborated on the recent re-
conceptualization of Stafford and Warr. They tried to clarify their hypotheses on the 
one hand and to expand the theory on the other hand. Paternoster and Piquero also 
provided a preliminary empirical test of Stafford and Warr’s theory which will be 
dealt in the following section. Firstly, Paternoster and Piquero stated that they would 
use the terms “personal experiences” for direct experiences with punishment and 
punishment avoidance and “vicarious experiences” for indirect experiences with 
punishment and punishment avoidance (Paternoster and Piquero, 1995: 253). 
Authors provided very substantial clarification of the theory of Stafford and Warr. 
For example, relying on the assumption that individuals have a combination of 
experiences and these experiences play an important role in deterrence process, 
Paternoster and Piquero illustrated under which conditions the effect of one type of 
experience (personal or vicarious) may be intensified or  soothed by the effect of the 
other (Paternoster and Piquero, 1995: 254). In order to make it clear, authors 
presented a hypothetical situation and argued that when an individual successfully 
breaks a law, then his/her personal experience with punishment avoidance would tell 
him/her that the sanctioning system is working improperly and if this individual 
observes that others who committed the same crime also escaped punishment 
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 (vicarious experience with punishment avoidance), then his/her perception of the risk 
of sanctioning would further decrease (Paternoster and Piquero, 1995: 254). 
  
Moreover, authors tried to elucidate a common obfuscation in the literature 
about deterrence and non-deterrence variables which was an issue in the re-
conceptualization of Stafford and Warr. Paternoster and Piquero agreed with Stafford 
and Warr on the fact that personal and vicarious experiences can be deterrence 
variables to the extent that they influence perceptions of sanction threat and the 
involvement in crime so; they should be incorporated to the research of deterrence 
process (Paternoster and Piquero, 1995: 259). However, Paternoster and Piguero 
went beyond this argument and expanded the theory by stating that there are other 
personal and vicarious experiences except the experiences with punishment and 
punishment avoidance that could also be deterrence variables by causing fluctuations 
in the risk perceptions of individuals. They enumerated these other experiences other 
than punishment and punishment avoidance as; the amount of informal surveillance 
one experience, one’s moral evaluation of each act and the closeness of emotional 
bonds with others (Paternoster and Piquero, 1995: 263). To briefly explicate each 
point, for the amount of surveillance; Paternoster and Piquero claimed that close 
supervision or monitoring by family members, parents, friends or relatives etc. would 
cause an individual to think that his/her possibility of committing a crime without 
detection is low and would increase his/her perception of the risk of being caught 
(Paternoster and Piquero, 1995: 258). For moral evaluation; authors argued that 
strong views about the immorality of the act would cause an individual to think that 
such abhorrent behaviors would be punished effectively which is another factor that 
augments the perceptions of risk (Paternoster and Piquero, 1995: 263).   
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 Another expansion of Stafford and Warr’s theory was made by Piquero and 
Pogarsky (2002). After elaborating on the re-conceptualization of Satfford and Warr, 
Piquero and Pogarsky pointed out the role of impulsivity as another factor that 
should be considered as influential in determining the effect of personal and 
vicarious experiences (Piquero and Pogarsky, 2002: 160).  Authors stated that 
previous researches on impulsivity and offending affirm that impulsive individuals 
do not weigh the consequences of their behavior and consequently less restrained by 
the sanction threats (Piquero and Pogarsky, 2002: 160). According to these premises, 
Piquero and Pogarsky (2002: 160) claimed that “impulsivity may also affect the 
relative weight placed on punishment and avoidance experiences in the formation of 
sanction risk perceptions”. In addition, impulsive individuals supposed to be self 
reliant and less dependent on the information from others in assessing risk and as a 
result they should be affected mostly by personal experiences especially by the 
experiences with punishment avoidance (Piquero and Pogarsky, 2002: 161). 
 
The last but not the least, Buikhuisen (1988: 182) listed the dynamics of 
deterrence with reference to various conditions that are emphasized in the literature 
as important elements which should be taken into account to comprehend the 
decision making process of an individual prior to commit a crime. In order to give a 
summary of the above literature review, these conditions can be enumerated as 
fallows; items referring to the legal aspects of the behavior concerned (classical 
deterrence theory), items referring to the prosecution (actual certainty of 
punishment), items referring to knowledge and perception of the sanctions concerned 
(perceived certainty and severity of punishment), items referring to the sensitivity to 
sanction (avoidance learning), items referring to the condition of the subject at the 
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 time he is about to commit crime (probable interferences in the rational decision 
making process), the meaning of the act to the potential offenders (deterrable 
individuals, impulsivity) and lastly items referring to the characteristics of the 
situation in which the illegal act takes place (situational factors that possibly affect 
decision making process) (Buikhuisen, 1988: 182-187). 
 
Almost all of these different variables in deterrence theory are considered by 
various authors in their research to reveal whether in practice, punishment (perceived 
or actual) with its various components (certainty, severity, celerity) has a deterrent 
effect on criminal behavior. In the following part, examples of some research testing 
the premises of the deterrence theory will be given in order to illustrate the divergent 
views in the literature about the deterrent effect of punishment. 
 
 
3.3. Testing Theory of Deterrence 
 
Most of the studies conducted in 1970s to test the deterrent effect of 
perceived certainty and severity of punishment concluded that they had found an 
inverse relation between perceived certainty/severity of punishment and involvement 
in crime. Thus they supported the hypotheses of the theory on high perceptions of 
risk of being caught and its deterrent effect on criminal activity (Anderson, Chiricos, 
and Waldo, 1978; Burkett and Jensen, 1975; Erikson and Gibbs, 1979; Grasmick and 
Milligan, 1976; Grasmick and Appleton, 1977; Jensen, Erikson and Gibbs, 1978; 
Kraut, 1976). 
 
On the other hand more recent studies testing deterrence hypotheses 
concluded that there is little or no effect of severity and certainty of punishment 
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 either perceived or actual. For example, Paternoster concluded from the results of 
previous perceptions research that there may be little relationship with perceived 
certainty and severity of the punishment and the individual behavior (Paternoster, 
1987: 214). He also stated that perceived severity may have even a weaker casual 
effect than perceived certainty (Paternoster, 1987: 189). He further emphasized the 
instability in perceptions of individuals and criticized prior research on deterrence 
because of neglecting this instability, having inadequate research designs in terms of 
methodology and data selection, and assuming every individual as rational which 
might not be the real case (Paternoster, 1987: 214). In another study, Paternoster and 
Iovanni examined the effect of informal properties of sanctions (loss of respect in 
social, family and occupational relations) and compare them with the legal/formal 
properties of sanctions (arrest and punishment) in a research done with high school 
students for crimes of petty theft, vandalism, drinking alcohol under age and 
marijuana use (Paternoster and Iovanni: 1986: 754). They found out that “social 
control works primarily through informal processes and; that once these are 
controlled, perceptions of severity and certainty of punishment have no affect on […] 
behavior” (Paternoster and Iovanni, 1986: 769). This finding is also consistent with 
the findings of Title (1977: 595) who argued that the impact of general or legal 
sanctions has a minor or moderate level of deterrent effect when compared with the 
fear of interpersonal loss of respect. Tittle derived this conclusion upon a survey 
conducted on 1993 individuals whose age are 15 and above and asked for 8 rule 
violations including taking something that does not belong to you worth about $5, 
taking something that does not belong to you worth about $50, smoking marijuana, 
gambling illegally, physically harming somebody on purpose, lying to your spouse or 
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 sweetheart, cheating on your income tax, remaining seated during National Anthem 
and a role specific deviance for those self-employed, employees, students and for 
homemakers separately (Title, 1977: 580). 
  
Another research that supports the idea of a more deterrent effect of the 
informal sanctions is the Green’s study of “Measures in Illegal Behavior in 
Individual Level Deterrence Research” with a sample of adults for driving while 
intoxicated. Green incorporated perceived certainty of arrest, perceived severity of 
punishment and moral commitment to legal norm, social disapproval by the others 
and social demographic features as independent variables (Green, 1980: 259-260). 
He concluded that informal threats of sanctions are the most important predictor for 
engaging in crime and moral commitment to legal norm as well as social 
demographic features such as being single or married; age etc. also have a moderate 
predictive power (Green, 1989: 267). In line with the above argument on the effect of 
personal traits and demographics Greg Pogarsky conducted a research to test the 
deterrent effect of certainty and severity of punishment but made a distinction 
between deterrable individuals and others (Pogarsky, 2002: 432).  He identified 2 
groups of people who are insensitive to legal sanction threats; one is acute 
conformists who are influenced by extra-legal effects and committed offenders who 
are incorrigible and then placed deterrable individuals between these two extreme 
groups of people (Pogarsky, 2002: 433). And upon the analysis of the data he 
collected by a survey on undergraduate students in which a hypothetical scenario of 
driving to home while under the influence of alcohol was presented, he concluded 
that contrary to the findings of previous studies severity of sanction has more 
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 deterrent effect than certainty of sanction for deterrable individuals (Pogarsky, 2002: 
445). 
 
Additionally, Anderson, Chirocos and Waldo’s (1978) research on perceived 
severity and certainty of both formal and informal sanctions their deterrent effect; 
produced results that support the premises about the greater influence of informal 
sanctions at the deterrence process. Authors, performed interviews with college 
students and tried to figure out the relation between formal and informal sanction 
perceptions and marijuana use (Anderson, Chirocos and Waldo, 1978: 106). They 
found out that there is a strong inverse relation between perceived certainty of 
punishment and marijuana use but a weaker relation between the perceived severity 
of punishment and the illegal act (Anderson, Chirocos and Waldo, 1978: 108). 
Moreover, their results illustrates that the relative impact of friends’ use/non-use or 
approval/disapproval has a greater impact than perceived certainty of punishment 
(Anderson, Chirocos and Waldo, 1978: 110-111). Upon these findings, authors 
concluded that perception of certainty and informal sanctions are independently and 
strongly associated with involvement in illegal act and when they operate together, 
their impact is greater than their impact separately (Anderson, Chirocos and Waldo, 
1978: 113). Their conclusions support the assumptions about the effect of informal 
sanction threats on decision making process when committing crime. 
  
Despite the research examined above, Grasmick and Appleton tried to answer 
the question whether threat of legal punishment is more effective when there is an 
existent threat of social stigma by using a sample of adults with a dependent variable 
of speed law violations (Grasmick and Appleton, 1977: 20). Their analysis suggests 
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 that perceived threat of legal punishment regardless of the level of perceived social 
stigma has an effect on the frequency of crime (Grasmick and Appleton, 1977: 25). 
 
 Authors concluded that “[their] data tend to support the view that an increase 
in the certainty of legal punishment, with no change in the level of threat of stigma, 
would result in the less frequent violations” (Grasmick and Appleton, 1977: 25). 
 
In addition, Grasmick and Bryjak performed a research on 400 adults and 
asked the involvement of these individuals in eight illegal activities which are theft 
of something worth less than 20 dollars, theft of something worth equal or more than 
20 dollars, gambling illegally, physically hurting someone on purpose, cheating on 
tax returns, use of fireworks in the city limits, driving while under the influence of 
alcohol (Grasmick and Bryjak, 1980: 478).  They conducted this research with the 
assumption that perceived severity of punishment at relatively high levels of 
perceived certainty has a significant deterrent effect (Grasmick and Bryjak, 1980: 
471). Authors concluded that “perceived severity of punishment if arrested is a 
significant variable in the social control process, having an inverse effect on 
involvement in illegal behavior” (Grasmick and Bryjak, 1980: 486). They also 
argued that the perceived certainty of arrest alters according to the level of perceived 
severity of punishment (Grasmick and Bryjak, 1980: 486). The reason behind the 
opposite result of their study form the previous examples lies behind their different 
conceptualization of perceived severity which put emphasis on consequences of 
punishment felt by the individual rather than determined by the researcher in terms of 
the time served in prison etc. Grasmick and Bryjak (1980: 475) persuasively argued 
that when measuring perceived severity, the researchers should pay attention to the 
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 individual’s values because “a person may not necessarily consider a fine less severe 
than the time spent in jail”. The interaction of severity and certainty in Grasmick and 
Bryjak’s formulation actually supports an earlier study of Tittle (1969). Tittle argued 
that the crucial question that should be asked about the severity of punishment is not 
its deterrent effect but the conditions under which the severity of sanctions is likely 
to deter (Tittle, 1969: 411). Tittle (1969: 417) found a negative and substantial 
association for only homicide rate and severity of punishment and interpreted that 
association as “severity might act as a deterrent only when there is high certainty of 
punishment”. However, Tittle also acknowledged that official penalties should not be 
only variable in measuring offense rates; there must be other variables such as 
character of socialization and sanctions of an informal and interpersonal manner 
(Tittle, 1969: 422). 
 
Furthermore, Nagin and Pogarsky (2001) tested their model of integrated 
deterrence with its three components as well as impulsivity and extra-legal sanction 
threats. They conducted a survey among undergraduate students and presented a 
scenario of driving while drunk (Nagin and Pogarsky, 2001: 874). They concluded 
that certainty and severity of punishment have an effect on predicting the 
involvement in crime however; celerity of punishment does not have the same 
significant effect (Nagin and Pogarsky, 2001: 877). In addition, upon the results of 
their survey, authors found support for the hypothesis of equal effect of extra-legal 
sanctions and legal sanctions in deterrence process (Nagin and Pogarsky, 2001: 879). 
Moreover, the severity of punishment is attenuated if an individual is present-
oriented or impulsive (Nagin and Pogarsky, 2001: 881-882). Another result of their 
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 research was that the certainty has a greater effect than the severity of punishment 
(Nagin and Pogarsky, 2001: 883).  
 
Besides the ongoing discussions in the literature on whether the certainty or 
severity of punishment or informal sanction threats have a deterrent effect on 
criminal involvement, there are studies which argue that both the severity and 
certainty of punishment should be given equal weight. Mendes’ (2004) analysis can 
be an example of this view. The author questioned the role that preferences, 
especially risk, play in deterrence strategies with an aim to provide policy 
implications for crime control (Mendes, 2004: 61). The final analysis of Mendes 
(2004: 71) illustrated that “the functional effects or weights of the probabilities of 
arrest and conviction, and the severity of punishment do not really vary” as much as 
the previous studies suggested. 
 
In addition; a recent test of deterrence theory has integrated association with 
delinquent peers and tried to figure out its conditioning effect on perceived certainty 
(Matthews and Agnew, 2008: 94). The hypothesis tested in this research is that 
people having an association with delinquent peers are less likely to be deterred from 
the certainty of punishment because “they are more likely to be rewarded for 
engaging in crime, be sanctioned for not engaging in crime, view the consequences 
of detection as less threatening, temporarily reduce their perceived certainty of 
detection and/or give less thought to the likelihood of detection” (Matthews and 
Agnew, 2008: 96). A survey was conducted on a sample of high school students and 
involvement in crimes of damaging property, shoplifting, using marijuana and 
drinking liquor under age was measured. The conclusion of the analysis supports the 
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 premise indicated above, and perceived certainty has a deterrent effect for people 
with no or some delinquent peers (Matthews and Agnew, 2008: 109). 
 
On the other hand, Paternoster and Piquero (1995) provided a preliminary test 
of the theory of Staffford and Warr (1993). They themselves stated that their research 
provides a preliminary test of the theory because they could not differentiate the 
effect of vicarious experience with punishment and punishment avoidance with the 
existing data in their hand (Paternoster and Piquero: 1995, 281). The collected data 
through a survey conducted on a group of 10th grade students and measured the 
variables of personal and vicarious experiences with punishment and punishment 
avoidance for the crimes of drinking liquor under age and marijuana use (Paternoster 
and Piquero, 1995: 259-260).  They found support for the theory of Stafford and 
Warr, especially the operation of personal and vicarious experiences in the 
deterrence process at the same time (Paternoster and Piquero, 1995: 281). 
 
The last but not the least example of studies testing deterrence theory is 
Piquero and Pogarsky’s (2002) research on the premises of Stafford and Warr’s re-
conceptualization. They conducted a survey on university students in which a 
scenario of driving while drunk was presented to the students. The authors found 
strong evidence that supports Stafford and Warr’s (1993) hypothesis on punishment 
avoidance and confirms the prediction of the effect of punishment avoidance on risk 
perceptions, in other words the direction of the relationship between the experience 
variable and perceived certainty is opposite (Piquero and Pogarsky, 2002: 178). 
Piquero and Pogarsky (2002: 178) also concluded that their analysis demonstrated a 
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 partial support for the operation of a mixture of direct and indirect experiences in 
decision making process. 
 
All of the researches cited above have divergent conclusions on the deterrent 
effect of perceived certainty and severity of punishment, extralegal station threats, 
moral commitments and prior experiences (direct or indirect) with punishment or 
punishment avoidance. However, except a few studies (Grasmick and Brjyak, 1980; 
Title, 1969; Green, 1989) in which samples of adults were used to test the theory; 
most of the authors proceeded their research and conduct surveys on samples of high 
school and undergraduate students. Many authors admitted the weakness of their 
sample and its limited representation of the population and called for new researches 
with more representative samples. This concern is valid especially when different 
situational and perceptual properties of teenagers are considered. High school and 
university students may involve in an illegal behavior to achieve acceptance in a 
group or they may not so rationally calculate cost and benefits of their behavior. 
Moreover, they may not be so sensitive to punishment or perceive certainty and 
severity of punishment relatively low when compared to adults because of the lack of 
knowledge and experience. Also, they may not have strong moral commitments and 
concerns on informal sanction threats as some studies suggest. 
 
Another weakness of these research is that most of them operationalize types 
of crimes with a wide range of minor offenses, however, they neglect more serious 
offences like homicide except Tittle (1969). Driving while intoxicated, petty theft, 
shoplifting, using drug or illegal substance, damaging property and drinking alcohol 
under the age of 18 are the examples of crimes which are used to test the deterrence 
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 theory. This is a crucial point since more serious crimes may involve more rational 
premeditation and the potential offenders of these crimes may be more sensitive to 
legal sanctions and may have a high perception of certainty and severity of 
punishment because of the seriousness of the crime. It is possible to argue that the 
more serious a crime is i.e. murder, the more resources allocated to arrest the 
offender and convict him/her. So this rationalization may well affect the perceived 
certainty of punishment. 
  
In the next chapter, I elaborate on the question of to what extent the premises 
of the deterrence theory are applicable to the mechanisms of international criminal 
justice especially when they operate under an ongoing civil conflict situation. In 
other words, I will identify which hypothesis is more relevant for crime prevention at 
an international level and in a conflict situation where there is a lack of stability in 
the society and lacunae in the domestic judicial system.  
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CHAPTER IV
 
 
APPLICATION OF THE THEORY TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
 
 
Recalling from Chapter II of this thesis, that examines the scope, evolution 
and enforcement of the international criminal justice system, the current chapter 
scrutinizes the deterrence theory in an international context  The purpose of this 
chapter is to discuss the applicability of deterrence theory to the international 
criminal justice system after presenting the main assumptions in this research that 
stem from the application of the theory of deterrence to the international criminal 
justice system.  
 
As discussed above, the main aims of divergent mechanisms of international 
criminal justice can be enumerated as follows: deterring future crimes, ending the 
culture of impunity (i.e. retribution), helping reconciliation and facilitating peace 
processes. Deterrence and retribution could be categorized as short-run aims whose 
effects are expected to be immediate in the course of an ongoing conflict whereas the 
aims concerning reconciliation and peace process have their effects in the long-run, 
which means that they are observable in post-conflict process. However, the effect of 
international criminal system and its mechanisms in post-conflict periods is not in the 
scope of this research. The main question of this research is that “How do the 
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 mechanisms of international criminal justice system contribute to averting grave 
human rights violations in civil conflicts?” Therefore, this research focuses on 
ongoing conflict situations. In other words, the primary concern in this research is to 
find out whether the short-run aims predetermined by international community in 
establishing several mechanisms to implement international humanitarian law are 
hitherto realized or not. The following section will reflect divergent views on the 
deterrent effect of international criminal justice system, which will be followed by 
the prospects of applicable premises of deterrence theory to the international context. 
 
 
4.1. Divergent Views on the Deterrent Effect of International Criminal Justice 
System 
 
The proponents of deterrence argument in the international context argue that 
the enforcement of international humanitarian law and prosecutions of major war 
criminals would contribute to the transformation from a culture of impunity to a 
culture of accountability (Mennecke, 2007: 328). The logic behind this argument is 
that the prosecution of high-level officials such as political leaders, heads of states 
and/or military commanders who are responsible for violation of humanitarian law 
norms “send a message that costs of ethnic hatred and violence as an instrument of 
power outweighs its benefits” (Akhavan, 2001: 7-8). 
  
In addition, Liberal Institutionalist view of international institutions and 
regimes posits that conflict in the international system can be overcome by 
international cooperation, which can be achieved through well-designed institutions. 
Therefore states engage in regimes and institutions to gain from cooperation. For 
international criminal justice system, the goal of the regime is to alleviate political 
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 and identity-based conflicts (Rudolph, 2001: 658). Furthermore, for international 
criminal justice system, not only cooperation and coordination, but legalization is 
important and required for compliance and deterrence, since Institutionalist point of 
view claims that a well-structured atrocities regime will not only hold perpetrators of 
human rights violations accountable but also deter future crimes and facilitate the 
mitigation of tension in conflict regions (Rudolph, 2001: 359). In that argumentation, 
the emphasis is given to the hard law aspect of international regimes, i.e. 
enforcement, since supporters of hard law argue that hard law enhances deterrence 
and enforcement by “signaling credible commitments and maximizing compliance 
pull through increased legitimacy” (Rudolph, 2001: 659). To define an institution or 
a regime as having the feature of “hard law”, institutionalist approach refers to the 
precise and legally binding obligations as well as an authority to interpret and 
implement the law in that regime, and argues that “hard law” restricts behavior of 
actors in the regime (Abbott and Snidal, 2000: 421-422). Since international criminal 
justice system have all three components of hard law or hard legalization, which are 
obligation, precision and delegation it is considered to be the high ideal type of 
legalization (Abbott et al, 2000: 401-406). 
 
Contrary to above assertions, there is also abundant literature opposing the 
asserted deterrent value of the international criminal system. On the one hand, there 
are opposing views on the very nature of the deterrence argument indicating the 
inherent theoretical problems in the theory of deterrence. Mennecke questioned 
whether it is possible to transfer the correlation between deterrence and punishment 
from national legal system to international legal system (Mennecke, 2007: 323). The 
author, while acknowledging the fact that lack of empirical study to reveal this 
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 correlation at the international context does not necessarily nullify the effect of the 
international criminal justice system, stated that deterrence is considered to be 
successful if violations of human rights cease to occur. However, to identify the 
exact reason of any absence of violation is difficult to determine, which theoretically 
poses problems (Mennecke, 2007: 324). While Mennecke’s reservation for the logic 
of deterrence and punishment could be rebutted by referring to the examples of 
empirical research in the criminology literature, his examination on the applicability 
of deterrence theory at the international level should be addressed. When the crimes 
that are punishable under international criminal law are considered, (i.e. genocide or 
crimes against humanity) which are part of a plan or policy involving many 
individuals, it is implausible to expect that this diverse body of perpetrators would be 
equally deterred as in the case of national criminal systems (Mennecke, 2007: 325). 
 
Another impediment for deterrence to be effective at the international level is 
the nature of the crime which dehumanizes the victim group and murder becomes a 
part of a larger project instead of a crime (Mennecke, 2001: 326). According to a 
survey conducted by International Committee of Red Cross, although parties to a 
conflict are aware of the limitations on the conduct of warfare, they do not regard 
their acts as wrongful due to the high degree of societal involvement and perception 
of the conflict as a total war which make the distinction between combatant and non-
combatant blur (Wippman, 1999: 477-478). There is also the belief that their attacks 
on civilians are acts of retaliation, since the other side is doing the same and they are 
defending their own society (Wippman, 1999: 478). When these motivations are 
considered, Wippman argued the risk of future prosecution and punishment seems 
slight at the international context (Wippman, 1999: 479).  Aukerman, in line with the 
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 above argumentation, questions the “ordinary crime analogy” in transferring the 
prosecution aims, i.e. deterrence, to international context. She argued that ordinary 
crime is committed usually for non-political reasons whereas extraordinary crime or 
international crimes has political purposes and questioned the goals of prosecution at 
the international level (Aukerman, 2002: 41-43). She further argued that even if a 
consensus is reached in the international community on the preventive effect of 
punishment for extraordinary crimes, the extent that an international strategy would 
meet the needs of victims is unclear and while addressing atrocities a strategy should 
establish a balance between the goals of victimized society and international 
community (Aukerman, 2002: 46). Instead of the priority given to deterrence as a 
purpose of international criminal justice system, she claimed that political and 
cultural factors of a particular society should be taken into consideration when 
formulating a strategy to address atrocities (Aukerman, 2002: 47). Although general 
deterrence argument in preventing future violations of international humanitarian law 
justifies selective prosecution which focuses on the punishment of high-level 
officials and does not require the punishment of all offenders, she emphasized that 
the deterrent effect depends on context, certainty and severity of punishment, the 
extend of public knowledge and the degree to which crime and offender is deterrable 
(Aukerman, 2002: 67). Furthermore, she stated that there is still the possibility that 
the offenders may chose to commit crime by deciding that risks are not that much 
high to outweigh the gains from the commission of crime (Aukerman, 2002: 69). 
However, as cited above, she acknowledged the consequences of an international 
arrest warrant may be as fearful as punishment for dictators and heads of states since 
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 they would be liable for arrest in every country which would make it difficult to hold 
power and to be recognized in the international fora (Aukerman, 2002: 69). 
 
In an analysis of collective violence, Mark A. Drumbl also questioned the 
contradiction between the extraordinary nature of the crime at the international 
context and the theories of sentencing and processes of determining quilt which 
remains ordinary (Drumbl, 2004: 541). He criticized the international criminal justice 
system on grounds that only selected individuals are prosecuted and punished for 
systemic levels of violence and “the enemy of all of humankind is punished no 
differently than a car thief, armed robber or cop killer” (Drumbl, 2004: 542). 
Additionally, the author referred to the group component of international crimes, 
which makes the acts of individuals in that group less deviant in place and time 
although these acts deviates from the international humanitarian law norm (Drumbl, 
2004: 567).  Since perpetrators of international crimes usually belong to a group 
“that shares a mythology of ethnic, national, racial or religious superiority, perhaps 
even infallibility” and consequently, the ones who commit extraordinary crimes may 
be the ones who conform social norms in that particular group and in the context of a 
societal breakdown (Drumbl, 2004: 567-568). So the author suggested that the 
influence of the group as a social agent should be recognized in international 
criminal system and any ignorance of the unique nature of the crime restrain the 
enhancement of effective methods to address atrocities and to promote accountability 
(Drumbl, 2004: 568).  Although the author admitted the fact that after the recent 
developments in the institutionalization of the international criminal justice, the 
possibility of apprehension is higher for heads of states or high-level officials, he 
criticized the rational actor assumption of the deterrence logic especially by referring 
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 to the group component and its applicability to the international context (Drumbl, 
2994: 589-590). 
 
However, when the objective of genocide is considered, it is possible to claim 
that there is a cost-benefit analysis and calculation at least on the part of the planners, 
since it is evident that such massive violations of human rights require the 
implementation of a well-designed program (Beigbeder, 1999: 79). Therefore, the 
objectives of genocide or other kinds of mass killing could include one or several of 
the following;  
1)  To eliminate a real or potential threat against the perpetrators’ 
population, their institutions, their religion, their lives, their 
property, their ambitions, in a self-proclaimed preventive defence 
exercise. 
2)  To acquire economic wealth or territory, in an effort to 
augment the country’s power and wealth. 
3)  To implement a belief, a theory or an ideology, or to 
eliminate a belief, a theory or an ideology considered hostile to the 
perpetrators’ beliefs and objectives. The ultimate purpose is to 
enforce conformity and social equality, to purify the race, to 
strengthen a new political regime in eliminating all potential, 
imagined or real political opponents, or, more drastically, in 
eliminating all social classes which do not conform with the new 
regime’s theories and objectives (Beigbeder, 1999: 79). 
 
 
 For example, the conflict in Former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia 
Herzegovina and Kosovo was systemic and planned as well as the conflict in 
Rwanda was not spontaneous outbreak of ethnic violence as a result of hatred60 
(Akhavan, 2001: 10-11). Therefore, it still is possible to expect that threat of 
punishment can increase the costs of pursuing a policy of inciting ethnic hatred and 
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60The systematic and carefully organized large scale military attacks against villages, internment of 
tens of thousands in concentration centers, torture, rape by military and police forces as well as 
deportation of millions were the evidences of planned ethnic cleansing in Former Yugoslavia. In 
addition the role of Radio-Television Libre des Milles Collines and other media organs in the 
incitement of genocidal acts in Rwanda through targeting population with no access to other resources 
was major (Akhavan, 2001: 10-11).   
 
 violence to gain and sustain power (Akhavan, 2001: 12). Although there is an 
opportunity to influence planners’ cost-benefit analysis by threat of punishment, once 
the ethnic violence is initiated, due to the extraordinary nature of crimes discussed 
above, it would be very hard to deter individuals with threat of future punishment, 
whereas there is the possibility of preventing these violations before they occur or at 
least inhibiting the resumption in that particular society (Akhavan, 2001: 12).  
 
On the other hand, it would be naive to expect any effect of these institutions 
on the course of the conflict immediately after they are established or involved, since 
it would be very hard to transform the deep-rooted culture of impunity to an 
accountability culture at the first hand (Akhavan, 2001: 9).  One of the classical 
criticisms of the ineffectiveness of International Criminal Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia in deterring future crimes is that although the Tribunal was created in 
early 1993, the Srebrenica massacre61 happened in 1995, while the Tribunal was 
active. (Meernick, 2005: 278). This example is given to indicate that criminal 
tribunals had no effect on the course of conflict; however a thorough analysis of the 
situation in the Tribunal would show otherwise. In the first two years of 
establishment, the court had no person in custody, while there were indictments and 
only in late 1995 some of the indicted individuals started to appear in front of the 
court62 (Barria and Steven, 2005: 356). In the case of International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda, the assumed deterrent effect was even more arduous to achieve, not only 
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61Srebrenica Massacre refers to the events that took place in July 1995 in which thousands of Bosnian 
Muslims especially men were killed by Bosnian Serb forces and which was also accepted as a 
“genocide” by both International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and International Court of 
Justice.   
62Dusko Tadic was the first detainee of International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, who 
was arrested in 1994 and transferred to the Tribunal on 24 April 1995 (ICTY, Dusko Tadic, Case 
Information Sheet, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/cis/en/cis_tadic_en.pdf).  
 
 because the difficulties in securing arrests but also the limited jurisdiction. 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established to try and punish crime 
of genocide and other violations of international humanitarian law committed 
between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, which means that the individuals 
who committed crime before and after this time interval are immune from legal 
consequences.63 In both cases, in Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the countries 
were also reluctant to cooperate with the tribunals although they were under the 
obligation to cooperate and comply with the Tribunals’ orders and requests for 
assistance according to the Security Council Resolutions establishing these courts.64 
In the case of Rwanda, several African countries refused to extradite indicted 
individuals and accepted refugees from Rwanda, among whom there were also 
genocide planners (Barria and Roper, 2005: 360). So the initially asserted aim of 
deterrence could not be realized at the first hand because of the difficulties in 
arresting individuals. Prosecutors of the Tribunals also admitted that true deterrents 
are not investigations and/or indictments but the execution of arrests (Rudolph, 2001: 
373). Therefore there is still room for the deterrence at the international level as 
Theodor Meron indicated that the failure of deterrence is not because it is inevitable 
but because “the prosecutions of war crimes on both national and international planes 
are so exceptional that criminals do not believe that they are likely to be prosecuted 
or punished” (Meron, 1995: 110). Therefore, it is possible to claim that tribunals 
were ineffective in deterring enough number of individuals to have a visible impact 
on the course of conflict where there is high-level of atrocities, but there is anecdotal 
evidence that the possibility of prosecution made some individuals abide by the 
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 provisions of international humanitarian law in the case of Former Yugoslavia 
(Wippman, 1999: 475).  Finally, there are more recent reports indicating that there is 
to some extent a deterrent effect of the involvement of international criminal 
tribunals in conflict situations. For example, after the referral of the situation in 
Darfur to International Criminal Court by UN Security Council, Human Rights 
Watch reported that people started to talk about The Hague and they are worried that 
they might go to The Hague (Mennecke, 2007: 324). In addition, there is not any 
study on the deterrent effect of those mechanisms on the course of conflict although 
there are studies indicating their impact on the post-conflict processes, societal peace 
and effectiveness in ensuring justice (Meernik and King, 2001; Meernik, 2005; 
Akhavan, 2001; Barria and Roper, 2005). In addition, some arguments presented 
above on the ineffectiveness of the tribunals in deterring future crimes are mostly 
based on the event-specific examples of Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda instead of a 
comprehensive analysis of the course of conflict. In this regard, while on the one 
hand bearing in mind the reservations of several scholars about the applicability of 
the theory to the international level, the following section will lay down the 
framework for this research to examine any deterrent effect of international criminal 
justice system on the course of an armed conflict. 
 
 
4.2. The Applicable Premises of Deterrence Theory 
 
When the crimes that are under the jurisdiction of international criminal 
justice mechanisms and the special conflict situation under which these mechanisms 
operate are considered, it would not be sensible to expect validity of all the 
presumptions about the factors that influence individuals’ decisions to involve in 
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 international crimes. To illustrate, there are many authors (Williams and Hawkins, 
1986; Paternoster and Iovanni, 1986; Tittle, 1977; Green, 1980; Anderson, Chiricos 
and Waldo, 1977; Nagin and Pogarsky, 2002) who argue that extra-legal/informal 
threats of sanctions have an important deterrent effect on individuals who are about 
to commit crime. However, for a civil war situation where there are most probably 
ethnic tensions and several rival groups fighting for different purposes, individuals 
would probably not be concerned about their reputation in the society and the 
disapproval coming from family, friends, relatives and society in general. It is likely 
that a potential human rights violator would fear incarceration more than any other 
extra-legal/informal sanction threats (Aukerman, 2002: 69). This assumption actually 
depends on the fact that in civil conflict situations where the mechanisms of 
international criminal justice system operate, it is very hard to speak of a regular 
society with its norms and values. 
  
On the other hand, research on criminology focuses on certainty and severity 
of punishment either actual or perceived. In addition, a substantial amount of 
literature in deterrence theory gives much more importance to perceptions of 
individuals about the severity and certainty of punishment to explain the deterrence 
process in decision making. Moreover, several scholars (Paternoster, 1987; Nagin 
and Pogarsky, 2001; Grasmick and Bryjak, 1980; Tittle, 1969; Matthews and Agnew, 
2008; Piquero and Pogarsk, 2001) working on perceptions of severity and certainty 
of punishment and their deterrent effect argue that the perceived certainty of 
punishment has a greater deterrent effect when compared with the deterrent effect of 
perceived severity. Recalling from the assumptions of Grasmick and Bryjak (1980) 
and Tittle (1969), it is sensible to postulate that the severity of punishment might 
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 have a deterrent effect when there is a high level of certainty of punishment. 
Furthermore, as Grasmick and Brjak (1980) in their research about the perceptions of 
certainty and severity argued, there should be a more intricate theory on the 
perceived severity of punishment since a fine may be as severe as several years spent 
in jail for an individual. Therefore, studies conceptualizing the severity of 
punishment by years of imprisonment are inadequate in reflecting the perceptions of 
individuals. However, the penalties in international criminal system do not vary as 
much in domestic criminal systems. For example, in the statute of International 
Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia in Article 24, the penalty imposed by the 
Tribunal is limited to imprisonment whose terms should be in accordance with the 
general practice regarding the prison sentences in the courts of Former Yugoslavia.65 
Identically, in Article 23 of the statute of International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, the penalties are restricted to imprisonment which should be in line with the 
general practice in Rwandan Courts. Both tribunals have the power to demand the 
return of the property and proceeds acquired by the criminal act.66 It is also possible 
to observe almost the same kinds of punishment when the articles concerning the 
penalties in the Rome Statute are examined. In Article 77 paragraph 1, there are two 
options for the judges of the Court regarding imprisonment. The Court may impose 
imprisonment for a specified number of years which may not exceed a maximum of 
30 years or life-time imprisonment when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime 
and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.67 The second paragraph of 
the same article lays down the penalties other than imprisonment which could be a 
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 fine under the criteria provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and a 
forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or indirectly from that 
crime. As above examples illustrate, the penalties in international criminal system are 
not very divergent, therefore the concerns about measuring severity of punishment in 
terms of the severity felt or perceived by the offender would not be a crucial concern 
in the application of the deterrence theory to international criminal justice system. It 
is possible to expect more or less similar perceptions about the severity of 
punishment. Moreover, as demonstrated above, severity is an operational factor in 
decision making when there is a high certainty of punishment. For that reason, in this 
research, certainty of punishment will be emphasized to a greater extent compared to 
severity. After stating the preference of perceived certainty over perceived severity, 
the question of determining perceptions on certainty of punishment comes into light.  
 
Although there is abundant explanations about defining, determining and 
measuring perceptions, Stafford and Warr’s (1993) reconceptualization of deterrence 
theory provides a credible and practical formulation for explaining perceptions about 
the certainty of punishment which will be employed in this research. Therefore, the 
answer for the question of where these perceptions about punishment certainty stem 
from is individuals’ personal experiences and their knowledge about others’ 
experiences (indirect experiences) with punishment and punishment avoidance. 
Apparently, direct and indirect experiences with punishment and punishment 
avoidance are gained as a result of individuals’ observation of the implementation 
and enforcement of rules and norms. Consequently, it is also possible to argue that 
there is a direct, relation between actual certainty of punishment and perceived 
certainty of punishment assuming that perceptions are influenced by direct and 
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 indirect experiences with punishment and punishment avoidance The below figure 
demonstrates this relation; 
Figure 1.1 Relation between the implementation of laws and deterrent 
effect of legal sanctions  
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The figure implies, it is possible to expect a directly proportional relation 
between the implementation of international humanitarian law and its deterrent 
effect, in the sense that more effective and decisive implementation of international 
humanitarian law in ongoing civil conflict situations would impel perpetrators of 
human rights violations to comply with the norms of international humanitarian law. 
As assumed in the literature of deterrence theory, the logic behind this reasoning is 
that individuals would experience and/or gain knowledge on the consequences of any 
gross violations of human rights and inhuman treatment of civilians which would 
lead them to consider that there is a high possibility of being arrested and punished 
for their crimes.  
 
 
4.3. Conceptualization, Operationalization and Hypotheses  
 
As noted above, the main question is to reveal the extent of the contribution 
by the mechanisms of international criminal justice system in averting grave human 
rights violations in ongoing conflict situations. Therefore, the independent variable is 
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 the mechanisms of international criminal justice system and their practices whereas 
the dependent variable is the prevention of grave human rights violations in conflicts. 
 
The mechanisms of international criminal justice system defined as the 
international courts, tribunals and special chambers which are established either by 
the international community, i.e. the United Nations, or by international agreements 
and which have jurisdiction to prosecute and punish international crimes under the 
international humanitarian law. On the other hand, grave human rights violations are 
considered to be war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide, 
which are defined in the Rome Statute’s provisions on elements of crimes. Therefore, 
war crimes are the violations of the laws of war which include but not limited to 
willful killing, torture or inhumane treatment, willfully causing great suffering, 
extensive destruction and appropriation of property, ill-treatment of prisoners of war, 
intentionally directing attacks against civilian population or against the personnel, 
installations, material or vehicles of humanitarian assistance units or peacekeeping 
missions.68 The crime of genocide, on the other hand, includes actions such as killing 
members of a national, religious, racial or ethnic group, causing serious bodily or 
mental harm to the members of group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions 
of life, imposing measures to prevent births or forcibly transferring the children of 
the group to another one.69 Lastly the acts of murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation of population, torture, rape, sexual slavery etc. constitute the crimes 
against humanity.70
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 The practices of international criminal courts in an ongoing conflict are 
operationalized in regard to two types of involvement: active and passive. Active 
involvement includes the stages of the investigations of crimes, the issue of arrest 
warrant, surrender to the court or arrest and the commencement of trial. Passive 
involvement, on the other hand, covers only stages of investigations and issue of 
arrest warrants, but excludes the stages of surrender/arrest and commencement of 
trials.  
 
The contribution of international criminal courts to the prevention of gross 
human rights violations will be measured by looking at the change in intensity of 
human rights violations and in the number of groups involved in the conflict. These 
two factors are important in determining the effect of international tribunals. Any 
decrease in the intensity of human rights and humanitarian law violations because of 
the possibility of prosecution and punishment would imply the deterrent effect. 
Additionally, any decrease in the number of groups in the conflict through isolation 
of a particular group because of arrests would serve a general deterrent effect by 
changing the perceptions on the certainty of punishment and a specific deterrent 
effect by incapacitation. 
 
Therefore, it is possible to claim that with passive involvement where there 
are low perceptions of certainty because of direct and indirect experience with 
punishment avoidance it would be very hard to expect a deterrent effect. On the other 
hand, with active involvement where the perceived certainty of punishment would be 
higher because of the direct and/or indirect experiences with punishment, it is 
possible to suppose a deterrent effect of threat of punishment. 
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Although there are divergent views on the deterrent effect of international 
criminal courts, this research intends to examine this relationship by referring to 
deterrence theory in criminology. In addition, another reason for examining the 
deterrent effect of international criminal system is that the asserted purpose of 
prevention of international crimes through prosecutions is widely welcomed by 
policy makers, which is also evident from the establishment goals of the International 
Criminal Court. Therefore, this research also intends to observe the impact of the 
International Criminal Court on the case of Democratic Republic of Congo  
 
 
4.4. Methodology and Case Selection 
 
The method utilized in this research is a single case study including a 
comparison of active and passive involvement within the same conflict since the 
main aim of the research is to examine the impact of the involvement of an 
international criminal court in an ongoing conflict.71 Therefore, I examine the case of 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where International Criminal Court is 
currently involved in. DRC case enables the comparison of the effect of passive and 
active involvement by an international criminal tribunal because the ICC opened 
investigations in 2004 and secured the custody of its first indictee in 2006. The years 
between 2004 and 2006 point to passive involvement since the action was limited to 
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71Additionally, since every conflict has its own dynamics, it would be more appropriate to scrutinize 
the effect of an international institution in the same conflict instead of comparing two different cases 
and inspect any change after involvement, while bearing in mind the deficiencies that might arise 
when making generalizations out of a single case study. Furthermore, when the scope of this research 
is taken into account single case study make a more detailed analysis possible instead of a 
comparative one. Moreover, there is an abundant amount of data especially on the international 
humanitarian law violations on a yearly basis about the case of DRC when compared to the other 
cases that ICC is currently involved in which makes a comparison of active and passive involvement 
more accurate. 
 
 investigations which were carried out by the Office of the Prosecutor. On the other 
hand, according to the operationalization of practices of international criminal 
tribunals, 2006 onwards ICC’s practices in DRC can are considered under the 
category of active involvement. Furthermore, currently three out of four military 
leaders,72 who were warranted for arrest, are arrested, transferred to the court and 
started to be trialed. The accused Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui are currently under the custody of ICC. The suspect Bosco 
Ntaganda remains at large.73  
 
Furthermore, situation in DRC was referred to the International Criminal 
Court by the DRC’s government which is an important factor to be taken into 
account.74 Referral by a state party, which is one of the ways of exercising 
jurisdiction of the Court, is very significant in securing the cooperation of the home 
state in investigations, prosecutions and arrests if the home state to the commission 
of alleged crimes refers the case to the Court. Since, the Court has no police or 
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72ICC-01/04-01/06 Case the Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/07 Case the Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Matieu Ngudjolo Chui and ICC 01/04-02/06 Case the Prosecutor v. Bosco 
Ntaganda  
73On the contrary, for example, in the case of Uganda, ICC started investigations in 2004 and issued 
arrest warrants for four individuals73 who are the top members of Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 
However, these four suspects are still at large (ICC 2009). Therefore, in the case of Uganda, ICC’s 
involvement at the time of writing is a passive one which does not constitute an appropriate case to 
observe the impact of both kinds of involvement, if any. 
74 However, for example, situation in Darfur, Sudan was referred to the Court by the Security Council 
upon the Resolution adopted in 2005 (S.C. Res. 1593, March 31, 2005). Since Sudan is not a party to 
the Rome Statute, besides securing cooperation of the state for investigations etc, the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the Court is challenged, which is a great impediment to the proposed deterrent effect. 
Although states are under obligation to cooperate with the court including Sudan according to the 
Resolution 1593, cooperation is very hard to achieve especially when one of the indictees is the 
President of the Republic of Sudan, Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir. 
 
 military force to execute arrest warrant state cooperation was to be secured under the 
Rome Statute.75  
 
The following chapter, after providing a brief history of conflict in DRC, will 
continue with the events that happened after the involvement of ICC until 2010. 
While narrating the course of conflict and revealing any change in the intensity of 
human rights violations, the qualitative data of International Crisis Groups’(ICG) 
CrisisWatch Database as well as the Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) Annual World 
Reports and International Institute for Strategic Studies’ (IISS) Armed Conflict 
Database will be the main sources of this research. In addition to the above stated 
sources, I refer to Human Rights Watch’s detailed reports on specific events since all 
the reports include witness testimonies about grave human rights violations and 
reflect the perceptions from the field. Finally, the recent surveys and projects of 
International Committee of Red Cross on the behaviors in war and experiences of 
people who suffer from armed conflict will constitute a baseline to understand the 
perceptions of people about international criminal justice system and the activities of 
its mechanisms.  
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CHAPTER V
 
 
CASE STUDY AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
Since this research aims to examine the impact of international criminal 
justice mechanisms’ on conflict situations in terms of averting human rights 
violations, two phases of ICC’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) will be compared. In addition the previously mentioned case selection 
criteria, DRC case has another importance in the sense that deliberate killings of 
civilians, rape, sexual violence and pillage have become characteristics of war. 
Additionally, attacks on civilians have been a fighting strategy.  
 
Furthermore, for the conflict in DRC, United Nations’ Security Council in a 
Resolution issued in 2003 confirmed that the sexual violence against women and 
girls has been used as a tool of warfare by all rebel groups as well as the atrocities 
against civilian population and other violations of humanitarian law.76 Therefore, all 
the atrocities perpetrated in DRC undoubtedly constitute either war crimes or crimes 
against humanity. 
 
 
5.1. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
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 Democratic Republic of Congo was established as a Belgian colony in 1908 
and gained its independence in 1960. After a couple of years following the 
independence, which passed in political and social instability, Mobutu declared 
himself as the president of the country after the November 1965 coup. Mobutu 
changed the name of the country to Zaire and retained his power for 32 years. This 
country of approximately 68 million population has experienced civil war, ethnic 
strife as well as international war after the 1994 Rwandan genocide and massive 
influx of refugees from Rwanda. 
  
The war in mid-1990s in DRC is called by many specialists on Africa as the 
bloodiest war since the Second World War (Turner, 2007: 1). It would not be 
mistaken to assert that war in Congo had not achieved so much attention when 
compared with the wars or conflicts that occurred in recent years, i.e. Rwandan 
genocide, ethnic cleansing in Former Yugoslavia, civil war in Sudan etc. although 
there were striking reports of nongovernmental organizations indicating the gravity 
of humanitarian crisis in the territory of DRC. For example, in 2002 Refugees 
International argued that there was a slow-motion holocaust in DRC (Turner, 2007: 
2). Furthermore, in 2005 the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator called 
the situation in eastern Congo as “the biggest, most neglected humanitarian 
emergency in the world today” which has surpassed the conflict in Darfur, Sudan.77 
Upon a nationwide mortality survey conducted during April – July 2004, it is 
estimated that 3.9 million people have died between the years 1998 and 2004 
because of the conflict when the survey results are combined with the previous 
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77UN News Center, March 16, 2005. “Eastern DR of Congo surpasses Darfur as biggest, most 
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http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=13675&Cr=democratic&Cr1=congo    
 
 surveys of International Rescue Committee (Coghlan et al., 2006: 49). Additionally, 
when the results are adjusted to a minimum and a maximum death toll, the numbers 
vary between 3.5 million to 4.4 million deaths (Coghlan et al., 2006: 49). Although 
most of the death causes are easily preventable ones such as malnutrition and 
infectious diseases instead of direct cause of violence, the findings of the same 
survey conclude that reduction in mortality is closely related with the reduction in the 
violence and improvements in security is the most effective way to reduce excess 
mortality in DRC (Coghlan et al., 2006: 50). Other research also claim that the 
conflicts since 1996 have cost approximately 5 million lives, more than 2 million 
internally displaced people and thousands of refugees in neighboring countries 
(Weiss, 2009: 115). 
   
The purpose of citing different surveys and researches is to reveal the gravity 
of the humanitarian crisis in DRC since 1996, however, there is no such threshold for 
the application of international humanitarian law norms. Moreover, the responsibility 
of the parties (government’s armed forces or rebel groups) under international 
humanitarian law does not depend on the number of deaths. DRC has been a party to 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 since 1961 and to the Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 since 1982. Additionally, DRC became a party to the 
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in 2002 which puts 
forward the rules and regulations operating in armed conflicts of non-international 
character. In addition, as explained in the Chapter 2 on the international criminal 
justice system, the norms of international humanitarian law are now accepted as a 
part of customary law and there is no need to be a signatory to the related 
conventions. Furthermore, rebel groups have also responsibilities and obligations 
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 under international humanitarian law because of the customary law status of these 
norms. DRC signed the Rome Statute in 2000 and ratified it on 11 April 2002 which 
signifies the approval of jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court by DRC. 
Therefore, by becoming a party to the Rome Statute, DRC accepts the jurisdiction of 
the ICC on its territory and on its nationals. 78 There is no doubt about the 
responsibilities and obligations of all parties in the conflict since the beginning of the 
conflicts in mid-1990s. Although the jurisdiction of the ICC covers the crimes 
committed after the entry into force of the Rome Statute which is 1 July 2002,79 the 
following section will provide a brief conflict history to understand the gravity of 
human rights and humanitarian law violations as well as the entrenched culture of 
impunity as the years passed without any prosecution of war criminals. Thus, the 
following section will elaborate on the conflict starting from 1994 to June 2004 when 
ICC got involved with the situation in DRC by opening investigations. 
 
 
5.1.1 History of the Conflict in DRC  
 
The genocide of Tutsi people in Rwanda in 1994 had a great impact on the 
stability in DRC (then Zaire). Especially Tutsi genocide changed the balance of 
power in eastern DRC in Kivu provinces (South and North Kivu) because of the 
enormous influx of refugees crossing the border between Rwanda and DRC (Weiss, 
2009: 116). The genocide ended when the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 
deposed Hutu-led government who were the perpetrators of genocide and this change 
in power caused approximately 2 million Rwandan Hutus to flee to North and South 
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 Kivu Provinces of DRC (Turner, 2007: 3).  When the fact that only 45 percent of the 
pre-war or pre-genocide population were living in Rwanda under relatively normal 
conditions (not in IDP camps or in bushes/forests etc), the genocide of 1994 had 
undoubtedly regional impacts (Prunier, 2009: 5). However, among other countries 
where refugees fled in post-genocide period, DRC was the most problematic one 
because only the major camps in North Kivu held around 850.000 people, including 
more than 30.000 former fighters of FAR80 with heavy and light arms as well as an 
officer corps. In the south, 650.000 refugees settled in camps around Bukavu and 
Uvira. In addition, majority of politicians and militias, including Interhamwe81 
militiamen, had come to DRC (Prunier, 2009: 25). Mobutu, then Congolese President 
was sympathetic to the overthrown regime of Rwanda and this enabled the leadership 
to reorganize easily in the territory of DRC (Prunier, 2009: 25-26). Thus, the 
authorities of the former Rwandan regime in DRC camps found the opportunity to 
regroup and regain power to attack Rwandan and Congolese Tutsis (Turner, 2007:4). 
 
In October 1994, ex-FAR soldiers attacked Rwanda from DRC and killed 36 
people in Gisenyi, a city at the border of DRC and Rwanda (Prunier, 2009: 26). This 
started the cycle of the conflict. Between the years 1994 and 1996 the attacks from 
ex-FAR soldiers and Interhamwe to Congolese Tutsi and Rwanda continued. Finally 
towards the end of 1996, Rwanda entered the territory of DRC to attack Hutu refugee 
camps in order to attack ex-FAR and Interhamwe as well as Mobutu’s army FAZ.82 
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80Forces Armée Rwandaises. The army of the former Rwandese Regime overthrown in July 1994 
which is responsible for the genocide of Tutsi (Prunier, 2009: xi).  
81“Those who fight together.” Name of the MRND –single party of the President of Rwnda at the time 
of genocide- politicomilitary militia and they were at the forefront of the genocide and did most of the 
killing (Prunier, 2009: xxi).   
82Forces Armées Zairoises. The national army of Zaire (Today’s DRC) which collapsed after 1996 
invasion and rebellion (Prunier, 2009: xi).  
 
 Uganda and Angola joined Rwanda immediately as well as the rebels inside DRC 
against Mobutu’s regime. Especially, ADFL83 was the major Congolese rebel group 
whose leader was Laurent Kabila that worked together with Rwanda, Uganda and 
Angola to remove the Mobutu regime (Weiss, 2009: 117-118). At the end of war on 
May 17, 1997 Kinshasa fell and Laurent Kabila declared himself the President of 
DRC (Turner, 2007: 5). 
  
However, as soon as the new regime was installed by Kabila, the reports of 
several NGOs and the UN on the massacres from the field started to be issued and a 
preliminary UN report84 investigating the fate of Hutu refugees who were staying in 
camps before the attacks revealed numerous massacre sites (Turner, 2007: 5). Kabila 
persistently resisted the UN investigations on human rights violations and in April 
1998 the investigators had to halt their work (Turner, 2007: 5). The initial year of the 
new government could be described as a battle between the government and UN 
investigation mission in which many UN investigators were arrested and briefly 
detained in order to frustrate them and leave DRC (Prunier, 2009: 159-161). 
Although UN withdrew from DRC, there were clear reports from journalists in the 
field that confirm the massacre sites as well as the efforts to hide the evidence 
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83Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo. Umbrella rebel organization 
created in 1996 in eastern DRC under Rwandan tutelage to fight against Mobutu regime (Prunier, 
2009: viii).   
84Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in its 65th meeting on 15 April 1997 adopted 
Resolution 1997/58 and requested from the Special Rapporteurs on the situation of human rights in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire) to carry out a joint mission to investigate allegations 
of massacres and other issues affecting human rights since September 1996 especially in Eastern 
Congo. As decided by the Resolution 1997/58, the joint mission presented its report to the General 
Assembly in its 51st session on 2 July 1997 (Report of the joint mission charged with allegations of 
massacres and other human rights violations occurring in eastern Zaire (now Democratic Republic of 
the Congo since September 1996, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess. U.N. Doc. A/51/942 (1997)) 
From the above explanations it is worthwhile to note that the Office of the High Commissioner’s 
report, not a binding one, solely aims to shed light to the mandate of the General Assembly related to 
its task on the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire). 
 
 (Prunier, 2009: 159). Kabila’s relations with his initial foreign backers started to 
deteriorate and the tension peaked when Kabila announced in July 1998 that DRC 
terminated the Rwandan mission of cooperation and asked the withdrawal of 
Rwandan troops from DRC (Weiss, 2009: 120). This kindled a war in which many 
African States were involved and which was also called the “First African 
Continental War”, because on August 4 a mutiny which started in Goma against 
Kabila’s government resulted in the reentry of Rwandan and Ugandan troops to DRC 
territory (Weiss, 2009: 120). Uganda and Rwanda jointly supported RCD85, 
however, Uganda later on supported another Congolese rebel movement, MLC86 
(Turner, 2007: 6). The turning point in the war was the decision of Angola to support 
Kabila together with Zimbabwe, against Rwanda and Uganda which turned into the 
war a continental one (Weiss, 2009: 120-121). Without the help of Angola and 
Zimbabwe, Kabila would have never succeeded in saving his regime (Prunier, 2009: 
187). 
  
However, the central control of DRC’s government was very weak in the face 
of several rebel groups supported by foreign governments. The eastern and 
northeastern parts of the DRC were under rebels’ control whereas other parts were 
under Kinshasa’s control. In the parts that were controlled by the government a 
massacre against Tutsis of Congolese or Rwandan nationality was organized by 
Kabila in 1998 which was never investigated (Weiss, 2009: 121). 
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85Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie. RCD was created in 1998 to fight against the regime 
of Kabila (Prunier, 2009: xv).  
86Mouvement de Libération du Congo. MLC was also created in 1998 to fight against Kabila’s regime 
by Jean-Pierre Bemba and turned into a political party in Congolese transition like RCD (Prunier, 
2009: xiii).  
 
 The regional war ended by Lusaka Peace agreement which was signed on 31 
August 1999 between 15 countries and most of the rebel groups but excluding 
RCD’s two important fractions as well as Mayi Mayi (Mai Mai) rebel groups who 
were established to defend their local community from all other foreign armed 
groups (Prunier, 2009: 223-224). In November 1999 to monitor the implementation 
of the ceasefire, the United Nations Security Council established United Nations 
Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo with 5537 troops and 500 
military observers and civilian components. 87  
  
Although Lusaka Peace Agreement seemed to end the regional war among 
states, it failed to contain the ongoing civil war in DRC between various rebel groups 
who were backed by neighboring countries either militarily or economically (Turner, 
2007: 7-8). Violence in two Kivus, Maniema, and in the Province Orientale 
continued from where reports of skirmishes, massacres and ambushes were 
continuously arriving (Prunier, 2009: 227). Along with the conflict between different 
rebel groups, in Ituri there were clashes between Hema and Lendu ethnic groups 
which resulted in the death of hundreds of civilians from both group at the beginning 
of 2000 (Prunier, 2009: 227). The clashes in eastern DRC in the following the 
months of Lusaka agreement could not be defined as a war between regular armed 
forces or certain rebel groups but rather clashes of low military intensity but high 
causality figures among civilians (Prunier, 2009: 228). While as early as November 
1999 UN declared situation in Ituri as a “catastrophic humanitarian situation” with an 
estimation of 5000 to 7000 deaths due to fighting since April and called for action, 
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87S.C. Res. 1279, November 30, 1999. 
As of February 2010 there are 18,645 troops, 712 military observers, 1216 police, 1,001 international 
civilian personnel, 2,690 local civilian staff and 629 United Nations Volunteers within the body of 
MONUC.   
 
 fighting between the branches of RCD and Ugandan troops continued in Ituri, Bunia 
as well as in North and South Kivu where 18 different rebel groups were engaged in 
war (Prunier, 2009: 230). 
   
Kinshasa’s control over the whole country was still very weak (almost none 
in some provinces), when on 16 January 2001 Laurent Kabila was assassinated by 
one of his bodyguards. This left the country with more uncertainty (Prunier, 2009: 
249). By early 2001, the situation in the continental war had already turned into a 
war full of weariness; Angola, Zimbabwe and Burundi had to deal with opposition 
groups and their own regime’s survival instead of getting involved in Congo’s war 
Uganda was under pressure to reduce its military budget and the government in 
Kampala started to lose its desire to be in the game, leaving Rwanda the only state 
willing and able to carry on (Prunier, 2009: 265-266). 
  
The violence, belligerent killings, rapes, and intentional injuries to civilians 
continued throughout 2002 by rebel groups especially in eastern DRC although 
Angola and Zimbabwe withdrew its troops from DRC while Rwanda, Burundi and 
Uganda announced withdrawal plans (HRW, 2003a). Various parties to the conflict 
gathered in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in February 2002 as envisaged in the 
Lusaka Agreement of 1999 and at the end of the year, government of DRC and 
armed/unarmed groups came to an agreement in Sun City, South Africa, which 
proposed the establishment of a transitional power-sharing government by June 2003 
in which Joseph Kabila would share his power with four vice-presidents from rebel 
groups (IISS, 2002). 
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 The report of Human Rights Watch about May 2002 Kisangani mutiny 
against RCD and the response of RCD to mutineers illustrates the gravity of the 
situation in DRC. All the witnesses interviewed confirmed that RCD attacked 
unarmed civilians, killed many and raped women as a reprisal (HRW, 2002: 13-19). 
In the same report it was also stated that RCD rebels clearly violated international 
humanitarian law and customary law under which they had the responsibility to treat 
people humanely who are not active in combat or who are civilians (HRW, 2002: 7). 
Furthermore, ethnic strife reoccurred between Lendus and Hemas in June 2002, 
which caused hundreds of civilian deaths together with the conflicts continuing 
between Mayi-Mayi militias, pro-Kinshasa groups and RCD in other parts of DRC 
(IISS, 2002). An important development in 2002 was that DRC government became 
a party to ICC and called for the establishment of an international criminal tribunal in 
order to prosecute and punish the crimes committed before the entry into force of 
Rome Statute (HRW, 2003a). 
  
Throughout 2003 the violence especially in Bunia, Ituri and North Kivu 
Province continued without any abatement. In February large scale fighting broke 
out between UPC88 forces and Ugandan forces in Bunia where over 1000 people 
were killed and continued till June 2003. Between May and June, rival RCD groups 
engaged in fighting in North Kivu while RCD’s Goma fraction started to fight with 
Mayi Mayi militias in South Kivu in July (IISS, 2003). There were still sporadic 
violence in Bunia and Ituri even after the deployment of UN and EU peacekeepers 
and there were protests against UN by UPC rebels in Bunia where UN troops and 
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 rebels exchanged fire. In November 2003 the situation again deteriorated in Ituri 
(IISS, 2003). Meanwhile the transitional government held its first meeting on 25 July 
and on August 20 military posts were distributed between Kinshasa’s government 
army and rebel groups as well as Mayi Mayi militias in which RCD-Goma and MLC 
secured deputy positions. By September 30, rebel groups were also allowed to form 
political parties (IISS, 2003). 
  
The HRW’s report on the atrocities committed in Ituri which is based on a 
fieldwork conducted in February 2003 confirms the committal of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and other humanitarian law violations by relying on witness 
testimonies (HRW, 2003b: 1-2). One of the most active groups in fighting in Ituri 
and Bunia was Thomas Lubanga’s UPC, which is the first ethnically based political 
party in Ituri composed of ethnic Hemas and which pursued an anti-Lendu policy and 
followed a way of eliminating Lendu and Ngiti in order to end the conflict (HRW, 
2003b: 21). HRW cited at least 3 massacre sites, several other skirmish areas, 
instances of attacks to humanitarian staff, summary executions, looting as well as 
rape, abduction of children to recruit as soldiers and most strikingly inhumane acts of 
cannibalism and deliberate mutilation of corpses (HRW, 2003b: 22-48). All these 
acts are the violation of Common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 
all the rebel groups as well as Uganda, Rwanda and DRC governments because of 
the support that they gave those groups who are responsible for atrocities. However, 
there has not been any investigation for the crimes committed in Ituri immediately 
after the conflict (HRW, 2003b: 48-49). Meanwhile a new national army was formed 
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 by government forces, RCD and MLC rebel groups, which was named FADCR89  in 
December 2003 (ICG, 2004: no. 5).  
 
 
5.1.2. ICC’s Involvement in DRC  
 
 
5.1.2.1. 2004 – 2006: Passive Involvement 
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Although since July 2003 transitional government in DRC had been in power, 
throughout the year of 2004 especially in eastern DRC violence, atrocities and 
instability continued without any significant decline in intensity (HRW, 2005a). 
During the conflicts between government forces and combatants, many instances 
were reported by Human Rights Watch in which grave violations of humanitarian 
law were confirmed especially in Ituri, North and South Kivu districts. Although 
MONUC deployed its troops in Bunia and achieved to curb atrocities in the city it 
failed to contain violations in rural areas. In South Kivu, in the town of Bukavu in 
May and June 2004 some dissident soldiers from Tutsi and Banyamulenge ethnic 
groups rebelled, which resulted in heavy government deployment in the town to 
repress the rebellion and commission of war crimes, killing and raping of civilians 
whom were mostly targeted on an ethnic basis (HRW, 2005a). HRW documented the 
war crimes committed in Bukavu in a more detailed report released in June 2004. 
The fighting erupted between the forces of RCD-Goma supported by the forces in 
North Kivu who were excluded from transitional government and pro-government 
forces in the newly created military region after the formation of unified Congolese 
army (HRW, 2004a: 1).  The attacks against Tutsi and Banyamulenge civilians, 
 
89Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo. Name of the national army which is 
composed of soldiers from former rebel groups and founded after the establishment of transitional 
government.   
 
 mostly women and children, were because of the fact that they are from the same 
ethnic origin with mutineers which could be considered as a kind of reprisal (HRW, 
2004a: 2-3). 
  
The effects of Bukavu Mutiny could also be observed in the massacre of 150 
Banyamulenge refugees in mid-August in Gatumba refugee camp in Burundi border. 
Although most of the attackers were Burundian, some of them were speaking in 
Congolese and might be from DRC (HRW, 2005a). The attackers came from the 
direction of DRC border according to the eyewitnesses and they skipped Burundians 
and only harmed Bayamulenge or others who were in the same tents with them 
(HRW, 2004b: 13-14).  Orders of investigation of the crimes committed in Gatumba 
came from the United Nations Security Council, Burundian authorities, Congolese 
army and arrest warrants were issued by the Burundian authorities. However, none of 
the perpetrators were arrested when this report was issued (HRW, 2004b: 28-29). 
  
In March 2004, the government of DRC referred the situation in the country 
to ICC. The ICC prosecutor decided to open investigations, especially for the alleged 
crimes committed in Ituri district on 21 June 2004 (ICC, 2004a-2004b). Actually, 
ICC’s prosecutor has been analyzing the situation in DRC since July 2003 and before 
referral from DRC government in September 2003 informed State Parties that he 
might seek authorization from the Court to initiate investigations (ICC, 2004b). 
Therefore, by mid-June 2004, ICC became involved in the conflict in DRC which 
was still ongoing in the eastern provinces of the country. 
  
 By 2005, although it was almost the end of the 2nd year of the transitional 
government, the government control was still very weak in eastern region of DRC. 
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 The agreement establishing the transitional government foresaw general elections to 
be held on 30 June 2005; however, the transitional government postponed the 
elections to the following year which caused huge demonstrations in Kinshasa. 
Meanwhile, some rebel groups refused to merge with the new Congolese army and 
kept their troops to fight with the government army. Other rebel groups and 
MONUC’s forces and all armed groups including government forces deliberately 
killed, raped, and abducted civilians and looted their property (HRW, 2006). In 
December 2004, the result of the fighting between government forces and rebel 
groups was at least 100 civilians causality, while in late 2004 and early 2005 during 
the operations against FDLR90, unpaid government forces raped civilians and looted 
their property (HRW, 2006). Human Rights Watch documented humanitarian law 
violations by FARDC at the end of 2004 and in the beginning of 2005 during the 
fighting in North Kivu. While FARDC was trying to assert control in North Kivu, 
they engaged in fighting with rebels loyal to RCD-Goma and in the conflict on 12 
December 2004 at Kanyabayonga FADRC army committed human rights abuses 
which was also confirmed by eyewitnesses’ testimonies of at least136 cases of rape 
gathered by MONUC human rights investigators (HRW, 2005b: 17-18). The same 
report also documented the atrocities in the conflict between RCD-Goma and troops 
loyal to government, especially Mayi Mayi militias in and around Nyabyondo 
throughout which Mayi Mayi troops attacked Hutu villages to kill civilians. RCD-
Goma responded by attacking Mayi Mayi stronghold without distinguishing between 
civilians and militias (HRW, 2005b: 19). Besides killings, rape of women and girls 
by both groups were documented (HRW, 2005b: 21-23).  
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 In February 2005, situation in Ituri further deteriorated where fighting 
between Hema and Lendu militias renewed as well as between RCD-Goma and Mayi 
Mayi militias where 9 UN peacekeepers were also killed (ICG,2005: no. 19). 
MONUC launched a counter-attack against UPC who was responsible for the attacks 
against UN peacekeepers and arrested two leaders; Thomas Lubanga and Justin 
Ngole in March 2005 (IISS, 2005). In April 2005, UPC militia declared that they 
ended the armed struggle (ICG, 2005: no.21) DRC’s Court sentenced 21 Congolese 
soldiers to death for the atrocities committed in December 2004 in eastern DRC 
(ICG, 2005, no.19). In March, another rebel group FDLR announced that they would 
give up armed struggle and return to Rwanda but instead got divided into smaller 
groups and stayed in DRC and continued killing, raping and kidnapping civilians. 
Especially a fraction of the FDLR rebel group, Rasta Movement, remained militarily 
active (HRW, 2006). At the beginning of July in South Kivu at least 40 civilians 
were burnt alive and 50 other were lethally injured by FDLR militias which also 
caused more than 30.000 people to leave the region (IISS, 2005). 
 
 MONUC initiated military operations against FDLR in North and South 
Kivu, and in Katanga region while the reports from the field indicated that local 
soldiers were attacking civilians in the ongoing conflict (ICG, 2005: no.24). July 
2005 in Equateur province there were reports on the killing, raping and stealing from 
civilians by government forces (HRW, 2006). In the meantime, in September 2005 
LRA91 which was present in southern Sudan for a long time entered DRC for the 
first time in its history, and went back to Sudan in October after the efforts of 
Congolese troops to disarm them (ICG, 2005: no.27).  
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 Upon the above analysis of events in 2004 and 2005, the passive involvement 
of ICC through investigations seems not to have any deterrent effect on the overall 
situation in DRC, especially in eastern DRC where humanitarian law violations in 
terms of killing and raping turned out to be a strategy in war and a mean of reprisal 
for various armed groups. This is due to violations of humanitarian law which were 
unpunished or uninvestigated neither by international authorities nor by the national 
judicial system. Because of the experiences with punishment avoidance either 
personal or indirect, the culture of impunity was deeply embedded in everyday life in 
DRC. Therefore, as hypothesized in the previous chapter, passive involvement of an 
international criminal justice mechanism in an ongoing conflict situation seems 
fruitless in terms of affecting the perceptions on certainty of punishment and 
deterring future atrocities. 
 
 
5.1.2.2. 2006 Onwards: Active Involvement 
 
2006 was an important year for DRC’s political life and ICC’s activities in 
DRC. General elections were held in 30 July, and President Joseph Kabila came to 
power as the first democratically elected president of the country in 40 years and the 
transitional government came to an end (HRW, 2007a). However, both government 
soldiers and other armed groups continued fighting and abusing human rights in the 
east. Fighting continued in the first months of 2006 especially between the forces of 
Laurent Nkunda, a former general, and government forces in North Kivu and 
between Mayi Mayi militias and government troops in Katanga region (ICG, 2006: 
no.30). In February 2006, MONUC declared that it might terminate its support to the 
DRC’s army in its fight against rebels in the eastern DRC if the government soldiers 
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 continue human rights violations during operations (ICG, 2006: no.31). In late 2005 
and in early 2006, HRW documented attacks on villages and killings of dozens of 
civilians in Katanga, Ituri, North and South Kivus by government troops (HRW, 
2007a). In an operation against rebel groups in Ituri, government troops killed more 
than 60 civilians whom they accuse of supporting rebel groups, raping women and 
girls, burning houses, churches, schools with the suspicion that insurgents and rebels 
were hiding in those places (HRW, 2007a). 
  
In February 2006, ICC issued an arrest warrant under seal for UPC leader 
Thomas Lubanga and in March 17, Congolese authorities surrendered Lubanga who 
was under custody in Kinshasa Penitentiary and Re-Education Center. He was 
charged with enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 15 into FPLC92, the 
military wing of UPC, and using them armed conflict in Bunia and Ituri from 
September 2002 to June 2003 and from June 2003 to August 2003 respectively. 93  
 
However, in Ituri MRC94 and in Katanga Mayi Mayi militias killed, raped 
and abused civilians throughout 2006. In some cases, Mayi Mayi militias publicly 
tortured, killed and cannibalized their victims to terrorize the local population 
throughout 2006. In May, the leader of Mayi Mayi militias, Gédéon surrendered to 
the United Nations and was handed over to Congolese authorities but still not 
charged with war crimes (HRW, 2007a). 
  
On the other hand, upon the HRW report many persons suspected of 
violations of international humanitarian law still continued in their posts or were 
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 appointed to new national or local posts as well as integrated national army. An 
example is Peter Karim, former MRC combatant appointed as a colonel in Congolese 
army who was accused of killing UN peacekeepers and taking hostages (HRW, 
2007a). Besides Lubanga, no other militia leader or soldiers from Congolese army or 
from other foreign troops in DRC, particularly from Ugandan and Rwandan armies, 
had not been charged for war crimes in Ituri (HRW, 2007a). However, a progress 
was made in Congolese courts in April 2006 when a military court found 7 soldiers 
guilty of mass rape of more than 100 women in 2003 and in August 2006 a militia 
leader, Mandro, was found guilty for war crimes committed in Ituri and was 
sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment (HRW, 2007a).  
 
Although there was improvement in terms of accountability for war crimes in 
DRC both at international and national levels, this improvement was a minimal one 
when compared to the gravity of humanitarian law violations. As to the ICC’ 
involvement, the arrest of the former leader of UPC, Lubanga, whose rebel group 
denounced armed struggle after the arrest of their leader by UN peacekeepers, might 
be considered as an active involvement in the sense that it succeeded to secure the 
custody of  an indictee. However, it is very difficult to assert that the transfer of 
Lubanga to ICC had any effect on the perceptions about certainty of punishment in 
the field after the evaluation of the events in 2006. There might be two reasons for 
the lack of the supposed effect of ICC after the arrest of Lubanga; one is that since 
there are too many groups involved in the conflict in eastern DRC, elimination of one 
rebel group after the arrest of its leader might not be effective in changing the course 
of the conflict. The second cause could be that there was still a very low perception 
about the certainty of punishment because; there were dozens of other perpetrators of 
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 atrocities that had not been charged for their crimes, and arrested, which makes the 
experiences with punishment avoidance incomparably enormous as regards to the 
experiences with punishment. 
  
Violence against civilians, impunity and continued conflicts in the eastern 
DRC were also the characteristics of 2007. In early 2007, “mixage” process was 
initiated. With this process, integration of Nkunda’s forces to the Congolese army 
was aimed. Additionally those mixage brigades were to fight against FDLR in 
eastern Congo (HRW, 2008a). The agreement between Nkunda and Congolese 
authorities moderated by Rwandan military officers was reached in Kigali, capital of 
Rwanda but the terms of agreement were never declared publicly (HRW, 2007b: 16). 
The government proposed exile in South Africa for Nkunda as well as dropping war 
crimes charges which were issued in September 2005 for Nkunda and for Mutebutsi 
for the crimes committed in Bukavu in 2004, Nkunda continuously stated his 
preference to serve in the Congolese army (FARDC) with his integrated troops (ICG, 
2007: no.42; HRW, 2007b: 16-17). Actually, Nkunda told in an interview with 
Human Rights Watch that he had never accepted to go on exile and a Rwandan 
officer confirmed that whether Nkunda would be appointed to a position in Cogolese 
army or would leave the country was ambiguous in the agreement (HRW, 2007b: 
17). Even in the first month of the process Nkunda threatened to halt the integration 
of his troops unless his political demands were realized (ICG, 2007: no.43). Instead 
of easening the conflict in the region through securing one rebel groups’ support in 
fight against another, mixage brigades further committed atrocities and killed dozens 
of civilians in their operations against FDLR. Additionally, the flawed logic behind 
the mixage process is well-documented by Human Rights Watch’s detailed report 
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 about the renewed crisis in North Kivu. Soldiers which were known by the local 
community as renegade before the mixage process were deployed to the same places 
as a part of the national Congolese army and were supposed to protect people against 
whom they previously committed serious human right violations (HRW, 2007b: 17-
18). Interviews with the local community in Rutshuru territory revealed this flawed 
logic more concretely. A woman who had fled a rape attempt by Nkunda’s soldiers 
in December explained how she felt insecure when she saw the same soldiers 
deployed in her town a week after as a part of the Congolese army. Furthermore, a 
community leader explained the disappointment in the local community when they 
saw the perpetrators of human rights violations in January 2007 as a part of national 
army which caused more people to flee and brought more instability (HRW, 2007b: 
18). However, in August 2007 mixage process collapsed and most of the Nkunda 
forces under mixage brigades rejoined Nkunda and the fighting between Nkunda and 
Congolese army resumed (HRW, 2008a). 
 
Killings, crimes of sexual violence, forced displacement, theft, extortion and 
destruction of property continued relentlessly in the conflict between Nkunda’s 
forces and Congolese army in late November 2006, in operations against FDLR by 
mixage brigades in early 2007 and in the resumed fighting between Nkunda and 
Congolese army in August-September 2007 (HRW, 2007b: 24). In two-week period 
of early 2007 Médecins Sans Frontieres registered 181 cases of rape at clinic in 
Rutshuru, some of which involved multiple attackers, acts of great brutality and 
victims as young as 5 years old (HRW, 2007a: 25).  
 
105 
 
 Although the crimes committed in eastern DRC were documented by 
MONUC and by human rights NGOs, the majority of them were neither investigated 
nor prosecuted and punished. In most cases the perpetrators and command 
responsibility were clear. For example, military prosecutor in Goma was dealing with 
17 cases in May 2007 and most of the cases were about desertion, whereas 3 cases 
were about sexual violence and was also preparing a case against 4 suspects accused 
of killing four civilians in Rubaya (HRW, 2007b: 58-59). Furthermore, magistrates 
investigating the killings in Buramba on March 10, 2007 perpetrated by Bravo 
brigade which is a mixage brigade loyal to Nkunda conclude that soldiers who were 
under the control of Colonel Makenga were responsible from the atrocities. 
However, one of the magistrates from the investigation team said in his interview 
with Human Rights Watch that he was willing to issue a warrant of arrest for 
Makenga but it was very difficult to execute this in practice and they had to be 
realistic and consider what they could do and the consequences (HRW, 2007b: 59). 
Besides the lack of investigations and prosecutions, one Congolese lawyer 
summarized the situation of accountability in Congo in his interview with Human 
Rights Watch as follows: “In Congo, we reward those who kill, we do not punish 
them” (HRW, 2007b: 59). 
    
Meanwhile, ICC unsealed the warrant of arrest for Germain Katanga in 
October 2007 and Katanga was transferred to the Court. He was allegedly the 
commander of FRPI95 and in early 2004 had been appointed as the Brigadier-General 
of FARDC by President Joseph Kabila. He held his post in FARDC until his arrest 
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 by the DRC authorities in March 2005. He was charged with crimes against 
humanity and war crimes particularly but not exhaustively; murder, sexual slavery, 
rape, using children under 15 years old to take active part in hostilities, deliberately 
directing attack on a civilian population, willful killing, destruction of property 
committed between August 2002 and May 2003 in Ituri region.96 Meanwhile on 29 
January 2007 Pre-Trail Chamber confirmed the charges against Thomas Lubanga 
and scheduled the trial to commence in March 2008. 97
 
At the beginning of 2008, a ceasefire agreement between 22 rebel groups and 
government in Goma boosted hopes for peace and stability in eastern DRC. 
Additionally, the government initiated Amani Program to coordinate peace efforts 
and disarmament (HRW, 2009a). The deal included ceasefire, troop withdrawal, 
creation of UN “buffer zone”, and amnesty for insurgency and acts of war but not for 
war crimes and crimes against humanity (ICG, 2008: no.54). Only one month after 
the signature of the Goma agreement, Nkunda withdrew from the ceasefire 
commission to protest the UN allegations of the massacre of 30 Hutus around Goma 
between January 16 and 20 by his forces. Moreover, other groups; mainly FDLR and 
Mayi Mayi continued clashes (ICG, 2008: no.55). In March, this time Mayi Mayi 
militias withdrew from the Goma ceasefire commission as Nkunda promised to 
rejoin (ICG, 2008: no.56). In May, aid groups in North Kivu declared that the recent 
fighting displaced at least 40000 people and additional estimated 5000 were 
displaced in the following month when FDLR attacked on 2 civilian camps in North 
Kivu (ICG, 2008: no.58). 
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In August 2008, heavy fighting resumed between Nkunda’s forces and 
Congolese army which had continued until early December on various locations and 
which had caused the death of more than 400 civilians and injury of 250 together 
with the exodus of 250.000 increasing the number of the displaced over one million 
in North Kivu (HRW, 2008b: 5). At the end of October CNDP98 took control of 
Rutshuru and Kiwanja and neither government soldiers or Mayi Mayi militias nor 
MONUC resisted, further CNDP informed MONUC in 24 hours that they were in 
charge of the area (HRW, 2008b: 6). Human Rights Watch interviewed with more 
than 100 family members and concluded that at least 150 people were killed in 4 and 
5 November in Kiwanja by CNDP soldiers in their house to house search for Mayi 
Mayi combatants and at least 14 of victims were children, 8 were women and 7 were 
elderly (HRW, 2008b: 8). Many witnesses also confirmed that CNDP soldiers were 
dragging dead bodies in houses and locking the doors in order to hide the dead in 
case of future investigations of crimes (HRW, 2008b: 10). Not only killings and 
summary executions continued but also sexual violence as well as the abduction and 
recruitment of children continued in North Kivu before, during and after the fighting 
erupted in August. Between January and June 2008 more than 2,200 cases of rape 
recorded in North Kivu and dozens of others raped after the recommencement of the 
combat in August, which according to estimates represents a tiny part of the 
unrecorded total number of cases (HRW, 2009a). 
  
The developments in justice and accountability were two fold in 2008. At the 
national level, a military court in Katanga continued proceedings against Mutanga 
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 and 25 other suspects accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed 
between 2004 and 2006. This was the largest war crimes trials in DRC (HRW, 
2009a). At the international level, upon an arrest warrant issued by ICC on 6 July 
2007 under seal, Congolese authorities arrested Mathieu Chui in February 2008 and 
Chui was transferred to the Court. ICC joined the case of Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Chui on March 2008. Mathieu Chui was the former leader of FNI99 and in 
2006 he became a colonel in Congolese National army, FARDC. The Court joined 
the case because it is alleged that FNI and FRPI militias under the command of Chui 
and Katanga, respectively attacked Bogoro village in February 2003 to secure Lendu 
and Ngiti control of the town and the attacks were directed against a military camp of 
Hema combatants in the village, however extended to civilians of Hema origin. 
Moreover, it was stated by the Court that killing, displacement of civilians and also 
destruction of property were the strategies followed by the perpetrators to control the 
village which continued even after the attack. The joint indictment against Chui and 
Katanga also involves usage of child soldiers, killings of civilians; especially from 
Hema ethnicity, inhumane treatment of civilians, sexual slavery and rape as well as 
pillage. 100 Meanwhile, ICC unsealed the arrest warrant for Jean-Bosco Ntaganda on 
28 April 2008 (HRW, 2009a). Ntaganda was the former Deputy Chief of Staff of the 
FPLC (Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo-military wing of Lubanga-
led UPC) and currently he is the chief of staff of Nkunda’s forces, CNDP. He was 
charged with war crimes of enlistment and conscription of children under age of 
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 fifteen and using children to participate actively in hostilities between July 2002 and 
December 2003 in the conflict in Ituri. 101
 
In October 2008, the conflict in Ituri was further deteriorated by attacks of 
supposedly initiated by Ugandan LRA rebels and extended to the Orientale Province 
in November. In December 2008 the situation became worse in the Orientale 
Province when at least five hundred civilians were killed, villages looted and 
thousands displaced while LRA rebels were fleeing from a joint operation of DRC, 
Uganda, and Sudan. LRA was previously operating in northern Uganda and southern 
Sudan where they also killed, raped and abducted thousands of civilians but shifted 
its operations to Congo in 2006 and by September 2008 they started to attack 
Congolese civilians too in order to punish local communities who had helped LRA 
defectors (HRW, 2009b: 4-5). Between September 2008 and January 2009 it is 
estimated that LRA attacks caused the death of at least 1033 people and abduction of 
476 children (HRW, 2009b: 5). The attacks of LRA between September and 
November 2008 was launched against several villages in the north of Dungu, 
northeast of DRC when Congolese and MONUC troops started to be deployed in 
Haut-Uele province for an operation against LRA headquarters (HRW, 2009b: 20). 
As retaliation, LRA turned to civilians and the tactic of using extreme violence 
against civilians was also used in DRC in northern Uganda and southern Sudan 
(HRW, 2009b: 20). The interviews of Human Rights Watch with captured LRA 
combatants revealed the command responsibility of Joseph Kony, leader of LRA, 
who had ordered the attacks against Congolese people that had turned against them 
and became their enemies and abduction of children as a part of the operation (HRW, 
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 2009b: 20). However, most brutal attack of LRA in DRC territory was the attacks in 
24 and 25 of December, which are also known as the Christmas massacre. When the 
deadline for LRA to sign the peace agreement passed in November 2008, Uganda, 
DRC and Southern Sudan initiated a military operation called “Lightning Thunder” 
to destroy LRA camps, search and destroy LRA forces, rescue abducted people and 
capture LRA leaders, especially the ones indicted by ICC102 (HRW, 2009b: 28). The 
operation was started in December 14 by the bombardment of LRA camp but Kony 
and other key commanders succeeded to escape and only 10 days after the 
bombardment, on December 24 and 25 LRA conducted coordinated attacks against 3 
places in northeast of DRC as a retaliation (HRW, 2009b: 29). It is estimated that at 
least 850 civilians were killed in the attacks that continued until the end of January 
2009 (HRW, 2009b: 29). 
  
Throughout the first months of 2009, the violence continued in the 
northeastern part of DRC because of the LRA attacks together with the violence that 
erupted as a result of the joint Congolese and Rwandan operation against FDLR 
rebels in eastern Congo (ICG, 2009: no.66). Rwandan authorities put an end to a 
rebellion initiated by Nkunda’s forces, CNDP, and arrested Nkunda (HRW, 2010a). 
Nkunda was replaced by Bosco Ntaganda, who was indicted by ICC for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity and he agreed to integrate CNDP troops to Congolese 
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 national army whereas his ICC indictment remained unresolved (ICG, 2009: no.66). 
In exchange, DRC authorities permitted Rwandan troops to enter DRC territory to 
chase and capture FDLR rebels (HRW, 2010a). On February 25, the 5 week-
operation was halted by a formal ceremony in Goma but the results of the operation 
in weakening the FDLR forces were uncertain (ICG, 2009: no.67). However, the 
result of the operation was almost clear in terms of the civilian causalities caused by 
the deliberate and retaliatory attacks by the FDLR forces (HRW, 2010a). The attacks 
against civilians by FDLR forces continued in March and April in North Kivu and 
South Kivu (ICG, 2009: no.68-69). The attack on village of Busurungi in North Kivu 
on the night of 9-10 May by FDLR rebels exemplifies the gravity of human right 
violations. According to the Human Rights Watch report at one night FDLR rebels 
massacred at least 96 villagers with machetes or by burning to death (HRW, 2010a). 
Not only rebels but also Congolese army violated international humanitarian law 
throughout the operation against FDLR. Between April 27 and 30, Congolese armed 
forces attacked camps in Shalio Hill and killed at least 129 civilians most of whom 
were beaten to death (HRW, 2010a). 
  
On May 21, an interim report issued by UN on the integration of rebel groups 
to the national army revealed the presence of parallel rebel-army command 
structures, child soldiers and extensive military abuses. Additionally the same report 
brought the evidence that Ntaganda, who is a wanted war criminal, was operating as 
army deputy commander (ICG, 2009: no.70). The promotion of Ntaganda to a post 
of general in the army was probably the result of the March 2009 agreement between 
CNDP and Congolese government on the transformation of the CNDP into a political 
party (ICG, 2009: no.68). However, the impunity for war crimes and crimes against 
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 humanity, which was already a general characteristic of politics and conflict in DRC, 
became even more entrenched with the promotion of Ntaganda in spite of the arrest 
warrant issued by ICC that should have drastically increased the perceptions on 
punishment avoidance for serious human rights violations. 
    
The military operation launched against FDLR rebels, Kimia II, on May 1 
was transformed to an offensive operation from a reactive one in July and United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees declared that since the beginning of the 
operation 35000 civilians were displaced. Meanwhile United Nations Secretary 
General issued a report on 30 June in which he called MONUC to withdraw its 
support from Congolese national army because of the responsibility of army units in 
human rights abuses (ICG, 2009: no.72). Moreover, while the operation was in 
effect, United Nations Security Council extended the deployment of MONUC until 
31 May 2010 and in the same resolution decided that MONUC military leadership 
shall confirm that all means had been undertaken to protect the civilian population in 
joint operations with the Congolese national army before providing support and 
MONUC shall intercede with the FARDC command if a FARDC unit receiving 
MONUC’s support is thought to be committing grave violations human rights, and 
shall withdraw support from these FARDC units if they continue violations of 
international humanitarian law. 103
 
While MONUC and Congolese national army (FARDC) was engaged in 
operations in North and South Kivu against FDLR rebels, LRA also continued its 
attacks in northeastern DRC. From December 14 to 17, 2009 LRA carried out an 
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 attack in Makombo area and its environs near the Sudan border where they killed at 
least 321 civilians and abducted more than 250 others among which 80 were children 
(HRW, 2010b: 18). While the Makombo massacre was the most deadly attack of 
LRA in its history, the attacks on civilians continued in other parts of northeastern 
DRC which caused the death of dozens, which is according to Human Rights Watch 
only a fraction of the total numbers that are unreported (HRW, 2010b: 34). Although 
at the end of December MONUC had already started to receive information about 
LRA attacks in northeast, the mission was mostly concentrated on the crisis in North 
Kivu and had limited resources to respond LRA atrocities. A team of investigators 
was eventually sent to the area to investigate the humanitarian law violations upon 
the amplified reports from the field in March 2010 (HRW, 2010b: 4). 
   
As also noted above, the fight against impunity in 2009 was hampered to a 
great extent with the promotion of Ntaganda to a rank of general in Congolese army 
in spite of the arrest warrant by ICC. The examples of human rights abusers who 
were granted posts in the national army continued to proliferate as well. For instance, 
Jean-Pierre Biyoyo, an indicted war criminal by a military court who escaped 
custody, integrated to the national army (HRW, 2010a). Government’s justifications 
that prioritize peace over justice made the situation worse (HRW, 2010a). Few 
national proceedings were obviously insufficient to transform the culture of 
impunity. On March 5, a Mayi Mayi commander and 20 fighters were accused for 
crimes against humanity and other charges, while also on March 11 other soldiers 
were convicted of rape as a crime against humanity and on July 27 Colonel 
Ndayanbaje Kipanga was sentenced to life imprisonment for crimes against 
humanity in absentia because he escaped custody before the trial (HRW, 2010a). 
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 Meanwhile ICC started the trial of Thomas Lubanga on 29 January 2009 and the 
trials of Katanga and Chui on 24 November 2009. 104
  
Overall, violence and human rights abuses increased in DRC in 2009 where at 
least, 2500 civilians were killed, over 7000 women and girls were raped, and more 
than 1 million people were displaced which increased the total number of IDP to 2 
million (HRW, 2010a). 
   
DRC army initiated a new operation against FDLR rebels on 1 January 2010, 
Ameni Leo, after the end of Kimia II operation. MONUC declared its support for the 
new operation. Upon the explanations by the DRC Government about the operation, 
army secured Dongo area in Equateur Province, however high death toll resulted 
because rebels resisted to the army (ICG, 2010: no.78). Meanwhile LRA attacks 
continued in north east and by April 2010 security situation in several provinces 
deteriorated, in Equateur and Orientale Provinces particularly (ICG, 2010: no.81). 
 
 
5.2. Analysis of the Case 
 
The above explanations of the situation in DRC aimed at revealing any 
impact of ICC’s involvement in the conflict to determine whether the Court 
displayed a deterrent effect for possible perpetrators of human rights violations. As 
formulated in the previous chapter of this research, any decrease in the intensity of 
the conflict and international humanitarian law violations because of the fear of 
punishment as a result of direct and indirect experiences with punishment would 
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 indicate that ICC had served its predetermined purpose of prevention of atrocities 
especially against civilians through deterrence. According to categorization of 
activities conducted by international criminal tribunals in the scope of this research, 
ICC’s involvement in DRC between 2004 and 2006 was a passive one since only 
after 17 March 2006, ICC could achieve to hold custody of one of the accused 
persons. When the activities of ICC in DRC are compared with the activities of the 
Court in other countries, it is possible to state that the most active involvement of the 
Court was in DRC because as of May 2010 ICC secured the custody of 3 individuals 
and started to try them. The appendix A demonstrates the comparison of the ICC 
activities in different countries as of May 2010. However, although ICC was most 
actively involved in the conflict in DRC after 2006, the above analysis lends limited 
support for the hypothesis on the possible deterrent effect of international criminal 
justice mechanisms. There are several reasons of the lack of supposed deterrent 
effect of ICC in the case of DRC, which are related to the internal dynamics of the 
conflict and politics in the country.  
 
First and foremost reason is the insufficient numbers of investigations and 
prosecutions of war crimes and crimes against humanity. When the gravity of human 
rights abuses in the conflict in DCR since mid-1990s is considered, the total number 
of individuals accused and arrested by ICC and also by national courts remains still 
very low compared to the numbers of perpetrators who escaped any charges of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. As discussed in the previous section, the 
number of individuals indicted and sentenced barely amounts to a hundred by 
national courts and ICC in total. Therefore, it is worth noting that although 
technically ICC’s involvement in DRC is an active one 2006 onwards within the 
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 scope of this research, it was apparently insufficient to transform the culture of 
impunity that has been persistent over decades. When the conflict history in DRC is 
examined, it becomes acceptable not to see an immediate effect of the Court’s 
involvement. Especially the direct or indirect experiences with punishment 
avoidance was so widespread among government soldiers as well as rebel 
combatants that the fear of punishment as a restraint on behavior is not a factor in 
calculations of individuals before committing atrocities. 
 
In addition to the lack of investigations and prosecutions, most of the 
perpetrators of international humanitarian law violations were appointed to the posts 
in the national army of Congo. Above section cited only a few most well-known 
names who are allegedly responsible for atrocities and who are appointed to the posts 
in the national army although their command and individual responsibilities in many 
massacre sites were confirmed by eyewitnesses. The major impediment to transform 
the culture of impunity is the case of Ntaganda and his appointment to a post in the 
Congolese national army despite the fact that he is warranted for arrest by ICC. 
Particularly the appointment of Ntaganda was very important when trying to figure 
out the effect of ICC on the course of the conflict. This appointment diminished the 
perceptions on punishment certainty. In this regard most of the perpetrators either in 
the national army or in rebel groups had their indirect experiences with punishment 
avoidance consolidated. When the fact that there is already very low perceptions on 
the punishment certainty on the part of ICC, the case of Ntanganda was a perfect 
example of punishment avoidance and even a verification of words of a Congolese 
lawyer cited above; “We reward those who kill”.  
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 Furthermore, most of the reports of NGOs and human rights activists working 
in DRC also provided evidence for parallel command structures after the 
establishment of the Congolese national army in the transition period. The leaders of 
many rebel groups retained their influence on their combatants even after they were 
appointed to the posts in the national army. So such rebel groups continued to attack 
civilians and to clash with other groups and the national army. This was totally 
contrary to the logic of establishing an integrated army, which was to contain 
different groups and to sustain peace and stability. The main aim of retaining power 
and parallel command structures both in the army and in rebel groups was to gain 
advantage in peace talks and to threaten the government to continue fighting in case 
their political demands were not met. A concrete example of this situation was the 
“mixage” process as explained above when government and Nkunda’s forces 
exchanged fire several times throughout the process because of the disagreements on 
the situation of Nkunda. These clashes caused extreme civilian suffering since most 
of the attacks were directed against them as a mean of retaliation and fear of 
punishment seemed not effective while bargaining was on the table about integration 
to the army, to politics and amnesty for certain crimes. 
 
Another impediment in DRC for ICC is that as of now none of the indictees 
have been punished by the Court. All three cases are at the stage of trial. Lubanga’s 
trial was started in January 2009, where as the joint trial of Katanga and Chui was 
started in November 2009. Although the Court has a heavy workload, in terms of 
reviewing the evidence presented by the Office of the Prosecutor, evaluating the 
assertions of the defense and hearing eyewitnesses, the process should be curtailed as 
much as possible while still abiding by the rules and procedures as well as the 
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 general principles of law in order to demonstrate and strengthen the commitment of 
the international community and to affect the perceptions on the certainty of 
punishment. 
  
Clearly, there is evidence that on several occasions during and after attacks, 
where perpetrators tried to hide themselves and evidence in order to avoid any 
charges in the future. In this regard, it is evident that the fear of punishment is 
actually existent; however, it is, at the time of writing, not so influential to affect 
behavior because of the low perceptions of punishment certainty. 
  
On the other hand, when the case of DRC is examined, it is difficult to assert 
that ICC served its aim of general deterrence after securing custody of 3 individuals. 
Yet this fact does not nullify the deterrence argument at the international criminal 
justice system. When the peculiarities of the conflict and the variety of rebel groups 
involved in the conflict are considered, it is evident that the major reason for ICC’s 
failure is the low levels of both actual and perceived certainty of punishment. To 
have a deterrent effect, it is evident that there needs to be an active involvement of 
international criminal justice mechanisms in the conflict. The case of DRC revealed 
that only investigations had little impact on averting human rights violations. 
However, the active involvement in terms of arrests and trials should be in 
proportion to the number of perpetrators to have a visible effect. In addition, 
international prosecutions should be reinforced by national proceedings to increase 
the overall perceived certainty of punishment by building enough precedents of 
arrests and trials forward.  
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 In addition, the active involvement of ICC in DRC case served as a specific 
deterrent in the sense that it had achieved to prevent the continuation of atrocities by 
the combatants of leaders who are under the custody of ICC. Thomas Lubanga’s 
rebel group UPC had officially declared that they had terminated armed struggle 
after the arrest of their leader. The rebel groups of Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui; FRPI and FNI respectively, did not engage in armed struggle or 
attack on civilians on a large scale since the arrest of their leaders. This can be 
regarded as a significant development in the conflict and a positive contribution of 
ICC with its active involvement in the case of DRC. Although there are still other 
rebel/military groups operating in the territory of DRC and although there are still 
violations of human rights, ICC’s activities in DRC are obviously effective in 
containing certain individuals and rebel groups associated with them through specific 
deterrence and incapacitation.   
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CHAPTER IV
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The deterrent effect of international criminal justice system has been a long 
debated issue. Even in the primary examples of international prosecutions, like the ad 
hoc IMTs at Nuremberg and Tokyo that took place after the end of the Second World 
War, the aim to achieve a general deterrent effect for future perpetrators was 
inherent. At the end of the Cold War, the establishment of ad hoc ICTY and ad hoc 
ICTR disclosed the understanding that judicial bodies could serve the purpose of 
conflict prevention through deterrence and could contribute to the efforts of bringing 
the violations of humanitarian law to an end in an ongoing armed conflict. Although 
there are other purposes of international prosecutions (such as addressing atrocities, 
retribution, ensuring justice, consolidating respect for human rights and rule of law, 
preventing vengeance, de-legitimizing leaders, and facilitating reconciliation) most 
scholarly and policy-oriented debate revolves around deterrence and international 
prosecutions. Especially, the aim in establishing ICC, as stated in the Preamble of the 
Rome Statute include putting an end to impunity for the perpetrators of most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community and contributing to the prevention 
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 of such crimes. The value given to the deterrent value of international prosecution is 
clear in ICC’s establishment. 105
  
In this regard, this research aimed to analyze the extent that international 
criminal justice mechanisms contribute to efforts of averting human rights and 
international humanitarian law violations through deterrence. Therefore, both 
international criminal justice system and deterrence theory in criminology literature 
were scrutinized and the applicability of the deterrence argument to the international 
context was examined. The main argument in this thesis is that if an international 
criminal court gets actively involved in an ongoing conflict, which would increase 
the experiences with punishment and perceptions on the certainty of punishment, the 
court would have a deterrent effect. As also the case study revealed, the international 
prosecutions first and foremost should secure the custody of indictees especially the 
ones who bear the greatest responsibility to change the perceptions on the fear of 
punishment and punishment certainty because mere investigations proved not to have 
any impact to change the behavior of perpetrators. However, even when the custody 
of indictees are secured, the entrenched culture of impunity, especially if conflict has 
a very long history with extreme violations of humanitarian law, could not be 
transformed to an culture of accountability immediately. Consequently, the 
perceptions on the certainty of punishment could not easily be altered in the wake of 
relatively small numbers of arrests when compared to the number of perpetrators 
who have successfully avoided punishment. Therefore, to achieve its aim of deterring 
future crimes, which is not an impossible, but a formidable task, an international 
criminal court should focus its efforts in securing custody of indictees to increase the 
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 experiences with punishment in the society. However, the task of deterring future 
crimes is challenging because ICC does not have its own police force and relies on 
the support of state parties as well as peace operation forces to secure the custody of 
indictees. 
Therefore, for ICC, cooperation with state parties, international organizations 
and NGOs is vital to effectively perform its tasks and achieve its aims. Additionally, 
to have a general deterrent effect as supposed by policy makers and some scholars, 
international judicial mechanisms should be supplemented by the national 
prosecutions to increase the numbers of individuals who are prosecuted and to avoid 
the cases that individuals who escape punishment. It is evident form the case study 
that in a conflict with various parties and numerous war criminals, the fear of 
punishment presented by international prosecution remains at low levels, which is 
the major reason of the need to pursue a joint prosecution strategy by international 
and national mechanisms. The principle of complementarity in the Rome Statute, 
actually foresaw this requirement under article 17 on the issues of admissibility. The 
article indicates that the Court shall consider a case admissible if a State, which has 
jurisdiction over the case, is unwilling or unable to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution.106 This principle is also stated in the preamble of the Rome Statute with 
the exact wording of “emphasizing that International Criminal Court established 
under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”107
 
The Review Conference of Rome Statute that started in May 31, 2010 and 
continued until 11 June 2010 has assessed the Court’s activities since its 
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 establishment while providing proposals to improve its efficiency on several topics 
as expected. Complementarity is one of the issues that were discussed under 
stocktaking exercise panels, at the end of which resolutions were adopted. In 
addition, the discussions on the principle of complementarity were planned to focus 
on the practical application of the principle and possible actions that could be 
undertaken by states in order to enhance and strengthen the capabilities to conduct 
investigations and trials. The Resolution adopted at the 9th plenary meeting on 8 June 
2010 reaffirmed the primary responsibility of states to investigate and prosecute the 
most serious crimes of international concern and the desirability of strengthening the 
domestic capacity and cooperation between State Parties and the Court to ensure 
investigations and prosecutions by emphasizing the principle of complementarity and 
obligations of State Parties under the Rome Statute.108  
 
Another important issue that was discussed is the international cooperation 
and judicial assistance which is regulated in the 6th part of the Rome Statute. Under 
this heading the agenda of stocktaking exercise was set as follows; challenges and 
good practices of states’ cooperation with the Court, implementation of legislation, 
agreements, arrangements and other forms of cooperation and assistance, cooperation 
of the Court with the United Nations and other organizations, and ways of enhancing 
knowledge, awareness and support for the Court. The declaration on cooperation 
distributed on 8 June 2010 summarized the roundtable discussions and emphasized 
the importance of the execution of arrest warrants in ensuring the effectiveness of the 
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 Court’s jurisdiction and the primary obligation of States to cooperate with the Court 
especially in the enforcement of arrest warrants.109
 
Furthermore, stocktaking exercise panels were planned to touch upon the 
dilemma between peace and. justice by focusing on the ways to integrate peace 
efforts and justice efforts, the role of the Court and reconciliation processes in 
facilitating peace and transition.110 The draft moderator’s summary about the penal 
on peace and justice distributed on 7 July 2010 indicated that all of the above agenda 
items were taken into consideration during the penal on peace and justice. While 
concluding the penal, the moderator stated that international criminal justice indeed 
marginalize the ones who incited war and encouraged justice efforts at domestic 
level so far. However, the desired deterrent effect could only be realized when justice 
is “perceived to the norm rather than an exceptional measure.”111
 
All of the issues that are in the agenda of review conference are highly 
important ones for the future activities of the ICC in terms of drawing a roadmap by 
revising the success and overall impact of the Rome Statute. Especially if the 
proposals that came out of the conference on the principle of complementarity and 
international cooperation are realized by achieving an increase in the numbers of 
prosecutions and arrests, ICC could reinforce its influence on conflict situations, and 
come closer to establishing a general deterrent effect.  
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CASES THAT ICC HAS INVOLVED AND THE CURRENT 
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112 Summons to appear before the court, not an arrest warrant.  
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 APPENDIX B
 
 
STATES PARTY TO THE ROME STATUTE OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
 
 
State Parties Ratification  State Parties Ratification  State Parties Ratification  State Parties Ratification 
Afghanistan  Feb. 2003 Brazil May 2002 Croatia  May 2001 Georgia  Sep. 2003 
Albania  Jan. 2003 Bulgaria Apr. 2002 Cyprus March 2002 Germany Dec. 2000 
Andorra Apr. 2001 Burkina Faso Apr. 2004 Czech 
Republic 
July 2009 Ghana Dec. 1999 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
June 2001 Burundi Sep. 2004 Denmark June 2001 Greece May 2002 
Argentina  Feb. 2001 Cambodia Apr. 2004 Djibouti  Nov. 2002 Guinea July 2003 
Australia  June 2002 Canada July 2000 Dominican 
Republic  
May 2005 Guyana Sep. 2004 
Austria Dec. 2000 C.A.R.  Oct. 2001 Dominica Feb. 2001 Honduras July 2002 
Bangladesh March 2010 Chad Nov. 2006 Ecuador Feb. 2002 Hungary  Nov. 2001 
Barbados Dec. 2002 Chile June 2009 Estonia Jan. 2002 Iceland May 2000 
Belgium June 2000 Colombia Aug. 2002 Fiji  Nov. 1999 Ireland Apr. 2002 
Belize  Apr. 2000 Comoros  Aug. 2006 Finland Dec. 2000 Italy July 1999 
Benin  Jan. 2002 Congo (Dem. 
Rep) 
Apr. 2002 FYROM 
(Macedonia) 
March 2002 Japan July 2007 
Bolivia  June 2002 Congo May 2004 France June 2000 Jordan Apr. 2002 
Bosnia-H. Apr. 2002 Cook Islands  July 2008 Gabon  Sep. 2000 Kenya March 2005 
Botswana  Sep. 2000 Costa Rica June 2001 Gambia June 2002 Korea(Rep. of) Nov. 2002 
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 Latvia June 2002 Mongolia  Apr. 2002 Portugal  Feb. 2002 Suriname  July 2008  
Lesotho Sep. 2000 Montenegro 
(Rep. of)  
Oct. 2006 Romania Apr. 2002 Sweden June 2001 
Liberia Sep. 2004 Namibia June 2002 Saint Kitts and 
Nevis 
Aug. 2008 Switzerland Oct. 2001 
Liechtenstein Oct. 2001 Nauru  Nov. 2001 Saint Vincent 
Grenadines  
Dec. 2002 Tajikistan May 2000 
Lithuania May 2003 Netherlands July 2001 Samoa Sep. 2002 Tanzania 
(United Rep. 
of)  
Aug. 2002 
Luxembourg  Sep. 2000 New Zealand Sep. 2000 San Marino May 1999 Timor-Leste  Sep. 2002 
Madagascar March 2008 Nigeria Sep. 2001 Senegal  Feb 1999 Trinidad and 
Tobago  
Apr. 1999 
Malawi  Sep. 2002 Niger Apr. 2002 Serbia (Rep. 
of)  
Sep. 2001 Uganda June 2002 
Mali  Aug. 2000 Norway  Feb. 2000 Sierra Leone Sep. 2000 United 
Kingdom 
Oct. 2001 
Malta Nov. 2002 Panama  March 2002 Slovakia Apr. 2002 Uruguay June 2002 
Marshall 
Islands 
Dec. 2000 Paraguay  May 2001 Slovenia Dec. 2001 Venezuela June 2000 
Mauritius March 2002 Peru Nov. 2001 South Africa Nov. 2000 Zambia Nov. 2002 
Mexico  Oct. 2005 Poland Nov. 2001 Spain Oct. 2000   
Source: International Committee of Red Cross Treaty Database, Rome Statute of International 
Criminal Court, State Parties. http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=585&ps=P  
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 APPENDIX C
 
STATES SIGNATORY TO THE ROME STATUTE OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
 
 
 
Signatories  Signature Date  Signatories   Signature Date  Signatories  Signature Date 
Algeria  December 2000  Israel  December 2000  Seychelles   December 2000 
Angola   October 1998  Jamaica   September 2000  Solomon Islands  December 1998 
Armenia  October 1999  Kuwait   September 2000  Sudan  September 2000 
Bahamas   December 2000  Kyrgyzstan  December 1998  Syrian  Arab 
Republic 
November 2000 
Bahrain  December 2000  Republic  of 
Moldova  
September 2000  Thailand  October 2000  
Cameroon  July 1998  Monaco   July 1998  Ukraine  January 2000 
Cape Verde   December 2000  Morocco   September 2000  United  Arab 
Emirates  
November 2000 
Cote d’Ivoire   November 1998  Mozambique   December 2000  United  States  of 
America 
December 2000 
Egypt   December 2000  Oman   December 2000  Uzbekistan   December 2000 
Eritrea  October 1998  Philippines  December 2000  Yemen  December 2000 
Guinea‐Bissau  September 2000  Russian 
Federation 
September 2000  Zimbabwe   July 1998 
Haiti   February 1999  Saint Lucia  August 1999     
Islamic  Republic  of 
Iran 
December 2000  Sao  Tome  and 
Principe 
December 2000     
Source: International Committee of Red Cross Treaty Database, Rome Statute of International 
Criminal Court, State Signatories. http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=585&ps=S  
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 APPENDIX D 
 
 
STATES THAT ARE NOT PARTY OR SIGNATORY TO THE 
ROME STATUTE 
 
 
 
1. Guatemala  
2. India  
3. Indonesia  
4. Iraq 
5. Nepal 
6. Pakistan 
7. Peoples Republic of China 
8. Turkey113  
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113Although Turkey is not a signatory or party to Rome Statute of ICC, it had actively participated to 
the efforts to create an international criminal court and the New Turkish Penal Code, which was 
adopted by Turkish National Assembly on 26 September 2004, had specific articles under the titles of 
“Genocide” and “Crimes Against Humanity”, articles 76 and 77 respectively. Additionally, with the 
constitutional amendment on 7 May 2004, the last paragraph of article 38, entitled “Principles 
related to offences and penalties” has changed as fallows; “No citizen shall be extradited to a foreign 
country on account of an offence except for obligations arising becoming party to the Statute of 
International Criminal Court.” Furthermore, Turkey upon the invitation of Germany became a 
member of an unofficial group named “Friends of ICC” and began participating meetings in New 
York and The Hague since January 2004. (Source: Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
www.mfa.gov.tr) 
 
 
 APPENDIX E 
 
 
MAP OF DEMOCRATİC REPUBLİC OF CONGO 
 
 
 
 
Source: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Cartographic Section, United Nations January 
2004 www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/drcongo.pdf
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